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REMARKS

ON THE

MANIFESTOS, &c.

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Spain Charles III. King

REMARKS

ON

THE RESCRIPT

OF THE COURT OF MADRID,

AND ON

THE MANIFESTO

OF THE COURT OF VERSAILLES.

In a LETTER to the People of GREAT BRITAIN.

TO WHICH IS ADDED

AN APPENDIX,

Containing the RESCRIPT, the MANIFESTO,

AND

A MEMORIAL of DR. FRANKLYN
to the Court of VERSAILLES.

" Though Faith and Truth were banished from the reft of the World,
" they ought, however, to be preferved in the Mouth of Kings."

Antiquated Maxim of an ancient King of France.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR T. CADELL IN THE STRAND,

MDCCLXXIX.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Courts of Verſailles and Madrid have, at length, ſubmitted to the world the motives, which they pretend to have directed their conduct with reſpect to England. The Reſcript and Manifeſto, publiſhed on this occaſion, are intended to work upon the underſtandings and affections of four diſtinct claſſes of men—The Rulers of other States—The Subjects of their own Dominions—His Majeſty's rebellious Subjects in America—and his loyal Subjects in every part of his dominions.

Perſons to whom theſe papers are addreſſed;

BUT, in the following Addreſs, it is not intended to examine them, either as they were meant to operate on the rulers of ſtates, or on the ſubjects of France and of Spain; or on his Majeſty's rebellious ſubjects in America. It is intended to examine them merely as they are addreſſed to ourſelves.

how far examined.

So far as they are addreſſed to his Majeſty's rebellious ſubjects in America, they are almoſt too ridiculous to deſerve a ſerious anſwer. Every thing ſerious, that can be ſaid about them, has already been ſaid, and well ſaid—"One ſentiment only can ariſe re-"ſpecting the conduct of theſe powers, who, affecting "the patronage of rights which *they neither feel nor* "*underſtand*, could have but one object—Amidſt the "diſtractions of the Britiſh empire to gratify their "own ambition [a]."

Not as addreſſed to the rebels in America;

So far as they are meant to operate upon the Rulers of States, it is the proper buſineſs of his Majeſty's

nor as to the rulers of ſtates;

[a] See Addreſs from the Eaſt India Company.

confidential

confidential ſervants to reply to them. They only are furniſhed with the proper materials: to them alone can the buſineſs be ſafely committed. And I hope and truſt, that they will acquit themſelves of the taſk, with that preciſion, which the juſtice of their cauſe enables them to uſe; with that ſpirit, which the inſolence of our enemies demands; with that dignity, which the honour of the crown requires.

not as to their own ſubjects;

So far as they are meant to operate on the deluded ſubjects of France and of Spain, they muſt be anſwered in another way. Conviction muſt be wrought, not by the force of argument, but by the vigour of arms. Would to Heaven, for the ſake of humanity, conviction could be wrought in a milder way!

but only as addreſſed to ourſelves.

So far as they are addreſſed to ourſelves; as they are meant to operate upon us; to warp our underſtandings, or to bias our affections; to weaken our efforts, or to depreſs our ſpirits; to alienate our minds from the government, or to leſſen our confidence in the councils of our Sovereign; I thought it might not be uſeleſs, and I truſted it would not be unacceptable, to point out to my countrymen the inſolence of ſtyle, the fallacy of argument, and the groſſneſs of miſrepreſentation, which ſtrongly marking both the Reſcript and the Manifeſto, reflect diſgrace on their authors; and point them out to us as the objects at once of our indignation and contempt.

Points conſidered.

CONSIDERING them with this view only, it will not be expected that I ſhould enter into a minute detail of particular facts, or into a refutation of injuries pretended to have been ſuſtained, demands of reparation pretended to have been frequently made, and as frequently refuſed. This is the proper buſineſs of men in office.

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It will be enough for my purpoſe, if I ſhew, that in admitting our rebellious ſubjects in America to a participation in all the privileges enjoyed by independent ſtates, Lewis committed an unprovoked injury on the people of Great Britain; that the reaſons alleged to juſtify that admiſſion, add inſult to injury; that his forming a treaty of friendſhip and commerce, of alliance offenſive and defenſive, with them, was intended to perpetuate the original injury; and laſtly, that the terms of accommodation propoſed by France and recommended by Spain, were meant to be a groſs repetition of the original inſult.

In theſe Remarks I have ſpoken as I felt; too regardleſs, I was fearful, of the forms and etiquettes of courts. On this head I was going to make ſome apology; but the parties ſtopped me. I ſaw the epithets "abſurd"—"frivolous"—"inſidious"—"perfidious"—beſtowed with a liberal hand by Lewis on the King of Great Britain. I therefore concluded this to be the language of courts; and cannot but congratulate myſelf, that, without knowing it, I have written like a courtier. Style.

REMARKS

REMARKS

ON THE

MANIFESTOS, &c.

FRIENDS AND FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN,

THERE is one circumſtance which muſt, I think, have ſtricken you very forcibly on the firſt peruſal of the papers here ſubmitted to your conſideration. You naturally expected to find ſolemn declarations againſt the crown, againſt the ſtate, of Great Britain: Inſtead of this, what do you find? Peeviſh invectives againſt a few individuals; childiſh declamation againſt the Miniſter and the Cabinet. You ſat down, no doubt, in the full expectation of peruſing a State Paper, breathing throughout that air of dignity, which becomes an independent Sovereign, addreſſing himſelf to the honour and the juſtice of nations. But how are you diſappointed! The papers fall from your hands, when you find nothing grate upon the ear but the low, virulent, malevolence, which characteriſes a party-ſcribbler, courting the favour of a faction. I will not ſay that this is

Style of the manifeſtos that of a party-ſcribbler.

altogether without example. The mighty Monarchs may have found a precedent; the one in the annals of his family; the other among the perſonal achievements of his own reign. For, ſince the acceſſion of the Houſe of Bourbon to the throne of Spain, the dignity of the Spaniſh character ſeems to have been gradually dwindling away. The open language, the manly deportment, of the Spaniard are no more. This appeared by the declarations of Spain in 1761 and 1762. Then it was, for the firſt time, that a King of Spain deſcended from the throne, put himſelf on a level with a private individual, and declared war, not againſt the Crown, nor againſt the State, but againſt the Miniſter of the King of Great Britain. His Moſt Catholic Majeſty is willing to renew, his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty is deſirous to improve upon, the dignified example. Now they not only declare war againſt the Miniſter, againſt the Cabinet, but declare it in ſuch a ſtyle, that one is almoſt at a loſs to determine, whether the declarations were penned by a Committee of the Bill of Rights men, or by the Cabinet of Verſailles; by the Select Men of the Conſtitutional Society, or by the Junta at Madrid. Certes, with as much propriety they might have run in the name of *Barré* or of *Wilkes*, as of *Lewis*, or of *I the King*.

Ridiculous cauſes of complaint, viz. miſconduct of the miniſter;

Thus you ſee—and it muſt excite your contempt, my countrymen, but you do ſee—it enumerated in the liſt of grievances, urged by an inveterate, hereditary foe—that your Miniſter has reduced your Country to the brink of ruin; or—as he politely ſtyles it—"to "ſuch a critical ſituation as ſhould have forced him "to change his political conduct." And is Lewis

then ſo anxious for the ſafety of Great Britain, that he is taking up arms to ſave you from the blunders of a weak, or the deſigns of a wicked Miniſter! If any thing could have added to the verdure of the laurels which then encircled the head of your *Pitt*, it was the Declaration of Charles: if any proof be wanting that your preſent Miniſtry is neither weak nor wicked, it is furniſhed by the Manifeſto of Lewis.

and violation of the liberties of America.

THUS again you ſee—and with what indignation, muſt you, my countrymen, ſee—it enumerated among this liſt of grievances—that you have compelled your Colonies to take up arms in defence of their liberties! And are Charles and Lewis, then, ſuch changelings, ſuch aliens from their race, that they can aſſume a character, the very name of which is wont to chace the blood from the cheek of a Bourbonite? Are they become protectors of liberty? Do their own ſubjects, then, in any quarter of their dominions, ceaſe to groan beneath the hand of arbitrary power? No: it is not there, it is not at home, that Charles or Lewis wiſh to give energy to the ſpirit of liberty. At home, in their own dominions, their own *certain knowledge* is the only criterion, their own *full power* the only meaſure, of right and wrong: at home, in their own dominions, Inquiſitions and Baſtiles afford the proper motives to obedience. And to their neighbours then are they ſo much more generous! To them do they wiſh ſo much better things!—Yes—There, ſo fond are they of liberty, that even let Rebellion aſſume the ſacred name, and behold Charles and Lewis ſtart up the natural protectors of liberty!

Account of the pacific Declaration of Lewis,

MUCH are we obliged to the tenderneſs of Lewis; much to his zeal in protecting the rights of our coloniſts: much, no doubt, do we owe to his readineſs to redreſs our domeſtic grievances. It is pure and diſintereſted. Should you be uncivil enough to doubt, to diſtruſt, he ſhall draw his own picture; at the ſight of it, your doubts ſhall vaniſh; diſtruſt ſhall give place to confidence. He gives us the moſt amiable ideas of the moderation and gentleneſs of his own character. At his acceſſion, he tells us, France was in the enjoyment of the moſt profound peace. To all the other powers he ſignified his deſire of perpetuating that peace; all thoſe powers applauded diſpoſitions ſo happy; in particular, the King of England teſtified his ſatisfaction; adding the moſt expreſs aſſurances of a ſincere friendſhip.

a mere matter of form,

THE court of Verſailles, I preſume, does not expect any great effects to be wrought by this pompous diſplay of the pacific diſpoſition, and pacific declaration, of Lewis; ſhe does not hope, that any great ſtreſs will be laid on the loud applauſes of aſtoniſhed nations. All this is but mere matter of form. The declaration affords no certain proof of the real diſpoſitions of Lewis: the applauſes afford no certain proof, that others believed in the exiſtence, or truſted to the duration, of the diſpoſitions announced. The tumultuous language of applauſe, if it prove any thing, proves rather the ſurprize of other courts, at his affecting diſpoſitions ſo uncommon in the Houſe of Bourbon.

explained.

IN plain Engliſh, the exordium amounts to this, and no more—"When I came to the throne I found "myſelf at peace with all the world. I was not mad

"enough

"enough to break that peace, till I had taken time "to look about me, and ſee how I might break it to "my own advantage. In the mean time, and to put "my good neighbours off their guard, I determined "to give the ſtrongeſt aſſurances, to *all of them*, that "it was my earneſt deſire to maintain the peace, on "my part, inviolate and perpetual. Theſe aſſurances "I gave. My neighbours heard and applauded. "Whether thoſe applauſes were marks of confidence, "or teſtimonies of ſurprize, it concerned not me to "enquire. It was in character that I ſhould ſo de-"clare: it was in character that they ſhould ſo ap-"plaud."

Weight due to the aſſurances of the King of Great Britain,

BUT the King of Great Britain expreſſed his particular ſatisfaction at this declaration; and gave the moſt expreſs aſſurances of a ſincere friendſhip. Who can doubt? His ambition led not him to invade the poſſeſſions, or to diſturb the government, of others. The quiet enjoyment of his own, was all that was requiſite to make him the firſt and the happieſt Sovereign in the world.

WHAT then more natural than ſuch expreſſions, and ſuch aſſurances! And to his expreſſions full credit was due. His aſſurances carried weight and dignity. He has a right to the confidence of nations. And that right is founded, not on a vain parade of words, but on a ſyſtem of moderation and equity, adopted at his acceſſion, and invariably purſued through the whole courſe of a reign of near twenty years.

FOR let us recollect, my countrymen, what was the ſituation of our King, when he aſcended the throne.

acquired by his conduct to other powers;

Let

Let us mark what has been his ſubſequent conduct toward other States. At his acceſſion to the throne, he found his kingdoms engaged in a bloody and expenſive, though a juſt and neceſſary, war. His fleets and his troops were victorious in every quarter of the globe. In every quarter of the globe the Britiſh banner waved triumphant. France ſhrunk beneath his chaſtiſing hand. Every thing conſpired that could have urged a youthful Monarch to give the reins to ambition. But the voice of humanity prevailed. The King liſtened to the firſt overtures of peace. Unfortunately for the cauſe of humanity, the negociation failed of ſucceſs. It failed from cauſes ſimilar to thoſe, which, as we now learn, precluded all hope of ſucceſs to the late mediation of Spain. It failed, partly becauſe the terms of reparation propoſed on the part of France were inadequate to the inſults ſhe had offered, and the injuries ſhe had done; and partly becauſe matters totally foreign to the buſineſs in queſtion were abſurdly blended with it. For at that period, too, Spain had been ambitious of the office of Mediator. Then, as well as now, to ſhew how free ſhe was from the bias of partiality, and therefore how fit for the office of Mediator, ſhe declared ſhe *had claims of her own to adjuſt.* Her mediation was not accepted. To impede, therefore, a treaty which ſhe was not allowed to negociate, the agent from France was inſtructed to make the adjuſtment of the claims of Spain a neceſſary article of a peace with France. The inſolent attempt was rejected with becoming ſpirit. The pride of Spain took the alarm. She joined her forces to thoſe of France. Repentance came cloſe at the heels of injuſtice. Her trade ruined; her treaſury impoveriſhed; her fleet deſtroyed; her ſettlements

ments torn from her; Spain trembled through all her remaining poſſeſſions. Unintoxicated by ſucceſs, again the King liſtened to the cries of humanity; again he ſtopped in the full career of victory; and granted his enemies a peace upon terms ſo liberal, that, in the narrowneſs of their own minds, they—to apply the language of Lewis—" attributed to weakneſs, or to fear, what was " the genuine effect of the pure love of peace." Yet again the Spaniard tempted the patience of the King; not by committing violence on the property of his people, but by inſulting the honour of his crown. The King was prepared to chaſtiſe the inſulter. But actuated neither by ambition nor by intereſt; ſteady to the ſyſtem which he has invariably purſued; he again liſtened to the cry of peace; accepted, at the intreaty of Spain, and through the mediation of France, the reparation offered to the honour of his crown: ſatisfied to have compelled the haughty Spaniard, by diſavowing the conduct of his officer, publicly to acknowledge, in the face of Europe, that he had dared to do, what he had no right to do, no courage to maintain.

not to be diminiſhed by the word of Lewis.

When a Prince, whoſe love of peace, whoſe reſpect to the laws of humanity, have been proved by ſuch a conduct as this; when he expreſſes his peculiar ſatisfaction at the pacific diſpoſition of his neighbour; when he gives aſſurances of the ſincerity of his own friendſhip; his expreſſions will carry conviction, his aſſurances command reliance. Europe will not readily believe, upon the bare word of one, who now, for the firſt time, makes himſelf known, and that in no favourable point of view, that ſuch a Prince has, all at once, abandoned his principles, and deſerted his ſyſtem.

Thus

Three obſcure paragraphs

THUS much for the exordium of the French Manifeſto; for the diſpoſitions with which Lewis mounted the throne; and for the ſituation in which he found his kingdom. The three paragraphs which follow, contain a very curious repreſentation of the conduct of the courts of London and Verſailles, from the period of the acceſſion of Lewis, to the moment when the Americans avowedly took up arms againſt their Mother Country. The ſenſe of this part of the Manifeſto is perplexed by a laboured obſcurity: attributing to one court the character ſuſtained by the other, it inverts all the facts which it pretends to ſtate. It will, therefore, be neceſſary to lay before you theſe paragraphs at length; to point out their incoherence and falſehood; and then to tranſlate them into the language of truth.

recited;

"THIS reciprocality of ſentiments," ſays the Manifeſto, "juſtified the King in believing, that the court "of London was, at length, diſpoſed to purſue a line "of conduct, more juſt, and more friendly, than that "which ſhe had purſued ſince the Peace of 1763; "and that ſhe would put an end to the arbitrary pro-"ceedings which the ſubjects of the King had expe-"rienced, on her part, ever ſince that period, in all "quarters of the world. And the King was perſuaded "that he might have the greater reliance on the truth "of the proteſtations of the King of England, as the "ſeeds of the revolution lately effected in America "began to unfold themſelves in a manner the moſt "alarming to Great Britain.

"BUT the court of London, taking for fear, or for "weakneſs, what was only the effect of the pacific "diſpoſition of the King, remained firm in her an-"cient ſyſtem; continued her vexations, and her acts

"of

" of violence againſt the commerce and the navigation
" of his Majeſty's ſubjects.

" The King, judging the King of England by his
" own feelings, laid before him, with the greateſt
" openneſs, all his grievances; relied on him, with
" confidence, for redreſs: Nay more, the King, in-
" formed of the perplexities, in which the affairs of
" North America had involved the court of London,
" avoided increaſing them, by inſiſting too warmly on
" thoſe acts of reparation, which the Engliſh Miniſtry
" was continually promiſing, and eluding."

In the exordium, we obſerve, Lewis confeſſes, not only that France was at the moment of his acceſſion, but that for a long time before ſhe had been, in a ſtate of peace. He ſpeaks of her as continuing to enjoy, as being in the habit of enjoying, a moſt profound peace [a]. She could then have no cauſe of complaint againſt England of any long ſtanding; none prior to this period of the acceſſion of Lewis. Such at leaſt ſeems to be the natural concluſion; but, natural as this concluſion may ſeem, it will appear to be ill-founded. For it ſoon pleaſeth his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty to retract his former aſſertion; and to aſſure us, on the faith of the ſame royal word, that ſo far from being in the habitual enjoyment of profound peace, his ſubjects then were, and for years had been, expoſed to the moſt humiliating, moſt diſtreſſing, moſt diſgraceful ſtate of war. For he tells us, " That, *ever ſince the peace of* 1763, his " ſubjects, in *every quarter of the globe*, had been " *forced* to ſubmit to the moſt *arbitrary proceedings* on " the part of England." We in England ſhould not examined;

[a] La France *jouiſſoit* de la Paix la plus profonde.

be ſo tame as to call this a ſtate of profound peace; ſo abject, as to thank our Sovereign for aſſuring the reſt of Europe, that he ardently wiſhed to perpetuate the duration of it. And, to do juſtice to the French King, he is as fickle in his deſire of the duration, as he is unintelligible in his deſcription of this ſtate; which is, at once, a ſtate of war and peace, of both and neither. Be the ſtate, however, in which he found his kingdoms what it would, he announced his deſire of rendering it perpetual—So he tells us in his Exordium.—Other nations applauded this diſpoſition—So too he tells us.—The King of Great Britain, in particular, expreſſed his ſatisfaction at it, and, in return, aſſured him of his friendſhip—For this you have his own word.—What concluſion does he draw? That becauſe the King was ſatisfied at this declaration, that Lewis wiſhed things to continue as they were; becauſe in conſequence of that declaration he offered his friendſhip to Lewis; therefore Lewis concludes, that he might depend upon it, that the King, by purſuing another line of conduct, would put things on quite another footing. And, he ſays, he might the rather depend upon this, "as the ſeeds of the American re-"volution began to diſcloſe themſelves, in a manner "the moſt alarming to Great Britain."

tranſlated into the language of truth;

WHAT are we to ſay of poſitions ſo contradictory, of a jargon ſo obſcure? We can only ſay, how forcible is truth! facts how ſtubborn! We can only pity Lewis and his Miniſters in their fruitleſs endeavours to diſguiſe the one, and to ſuppreſs the other. The only aſſiſtance we can render them is, "*reddere ſua* "*cuique*;" to give to each of the courts the parts each, in fact, ſuſtained. And, by this aſſiſtance, the paragraphs

graphs before us, tranſlated into the language of truth, will give us the following very fair account of the real intentions of Lewis.

" WHEN I came to the throne, France was, and " for a long time had been, in a ſtate of profound " peace. So far, I mean, as depended *on the conduct* " *of my neighbours.* True, indeed, it is, that, ever " ſince the peace of 1763, France had been employ- " ing her uſual arts in ſecretly fomenting diſturbances " and diſtractions among her neighbours. In parti- " cular, ſhe had been ſecretly giving every encou- " ragement to the Britiſh Colonies in America, to " tempt them to revolt from their Mother Country. " To this purpoſe ſhe had clandeſtinely ſupplied them " with officers, arms, ammunition, money. Hither- " to ſhe had acted with caution; becauſe hitherto " the event had been doubtful. The ſeeds of re- " bellion, though cheriſhed by her foſtering hand, " had not yet expanded themſelves. Now I ſaw them " expand; I ſaw that they had taken root. England " was alarmed. Now then, I thought, was the time, " by little and little, to become more open in the " ſervice of my friends, and in the promotion of our " common intereſts. England, I concluded, would " not be haſty in taking effectual vengeance. She " would begin, at leaſt, by remonſtrance and com- " plaint. Theſe I could elude. Should ſhe go far- " ther, ſearch the veſſels employed in this friendly " traffic, confiſcate the contraband goods; then I " could recriminate, ſet remonſtrance againſt remon- " ſtrance, complaint againſt complaint; and ſo in- " creaſe, an hundred-fold, the perplexities in which " the court of London was already involved.

"For a while my ſcheme ſucceeded. For a while "the King of Great Britain was deceived by the ſin- "cerity of his own heart, and the duplicity of mine. "He judged of my feelings by his own. He laid be- "fore me, with all the openneſs of candor, the griev- "ances of which he had to complain. He expected, "with all the confidence of honour, a prompt, and "a full, redreſs. To redreſs was never in my inten- "tion. But I watched, with a careful eye, the pro- "greſs of rebellion. I waited till things ſhould be "ripe for an open avowal. For the preſent I tem- "poriſed. I directed my miniſters to promiſe redreſs. "I as conſtantly ordered them to elude the perform- "ance.

"The forbearance of the King of England his "friends might, if they pleaſed, attribute to his love "of peace. I judged him by my own feelings. I "aſcribed it to the only motives, which could have "induced me to act the ſame part—to weakneſs or to "fear. Thus emboldened, I went on. I perſevered "in the ſyſtem I had adopted. I was more open in "aſſiſting the Americans to ruin the commerce, and "to diſmember the empire of Great Britain. Com- "plaints grew louder; demands of redreſs more per- "emptory. I anſwered them by counter-complaints. "I repreſented as grievances, the ſteps which Great "Britain could not but take, for ſtopping my co- "operation in the plan of effecting her ruin."

and made conſiſtent with the reſt of the Ma- niſeſto;

I appeal to yourſelves, my countrymen! Can any other interpretation be put upon this part of the Mani- feſto? Certainly not; if it is to be rendered, in any degree, conſiſtent with facts; conſiſtent with what im- mediately follows in the Manifeſto itſelf. Turn to it,

my

my countrymen! See with your own eyes. Mark with what inſolence the perfidy of France is openly avowed. Hitherto you have ſeen his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty ſtudying to conceal his deſigns. Now you ſhall ſee him lift up the maſk; ſtand forth confeſt, the predetermined invader of our deareſt rights. Were we ſcrutinizing the conduct of an individual, one reflection would ſtrike with irreſiſtible force. Scarce can the reſpect due to Kings repreſs it. Treachery—ſpeaking of an individual, we ſhould ſay—Treachery, when crowned with ſucceſs, diſdains concealment. We ſhould recollect, that, when ſucceſs ſeemed certain, even a Dr. Wolfe [b] could turn upon the friend whom he had betrayed; avow his perfidy; and laugh at the want of diſcernment, which had ſuffered him ſo long to eſcape detection.

and the countenance ſhewn to the Americans in arms;

Such, the Manifeſto informs us, was the ſituation of the two courts when the Colonies took up arms againſt their Mother Country. Well! and what change did this event produce in the reſpective ſituations of the two courts. Mark it well, my countrymen! From the moment the Americans commence hoſtilities againſt Great Britain, they riſe in the eſtimation of France. Before, they were *Britiſh Colonies*; the moment they arm againſt Britain, they are no longer our Colonies, they riſe to the dignity of the *United States of North America.* Before, they were entitled to *no national* privileges, to no national advantages in France; the moment they arm againſt Britain, they are entitled to a participation *in all the privileges* which *independent nations* enjoy.

[b] The Engliſh Tartuffe.

"I,"

and the decision in favour of their claims;

"I," says Lewis, "told the King of England, that "I was not, did not pretend to be, judge in the quar- "rel between him and his *late* Colonies: that it was "not my business to avenge it." Who appealed to his judgment? Who called on him to avenge? Not the King of Great Britain; he required him only to be neuter. God forbid he should ever appeal to France as a judge; ever call on her as an avenger! Something there may be to apprehend from Lewis as an enemy: But woe to the people whom he calls his friends! Certain ruin must overwhelm them the moment he is to sit as their judge, or to act as their avenger. America will feel this truth. May she feel it ere it be too late! But, unqualified as he owns himself, for the task of judging, not called to it, not pretending to it, why has he then judged, and decided? Does he not judge, does he not decide, when he calls them "*the late* [c] *Co-* "*lonies of the King?*" declares they were "*compelled* to "take up arms in defence of their rights?" Is not this to decide, that they are of right emancipated; no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the crown of England? Does he not judge, does he not decide, when he styles them *The United States of North America?* Is not this to decide that they have justly acquired the rights of independent States? Does he not corroborate this decision, when he grants them, as of right, a participation in all the privileges enjoyed by other nations?

and the reason assigned for this conduct;

HAD they this participation before they took up arms? No. Did the King call on France to deprive the Americans of any privileges, which they had before enjoyed? Nor that neither. To shut his ports against

[c] Les *anciennes* Colonies.

them,

them, to prohibit his ſubjects from all commerce, all connection with them, unleſs through the intervention of Great Britain, was a duty impoſed upon Lewis by the faith of treaties. To treat them as rebels, ſo long as they were in arms againſt their lawful ſovereign, was a duty impoſed upon him by the law of nations. And yet Lewis can tell us, "that *nothing impoſed theſe things as duties upon him.* But why, after all, ſhould rebels in arms be entitled to a participation in the rights of nations? Why entitled to the protection, why ſtart up equals of lawful ſovereigns? The moſt Chriſtian King, the firſt-born of the Church, ſhall reſolve the queſtion. His ideas of the duties of ſovereigns are not drawn from treaties, or from the law of nations, but from a more convenient ſyſtem.—Hear his anſwer —MY INTEREST REQUIRED IT!!! When Kings can hold ſuch language as this, we know not what to ſay. Indignation is ſilenced by ſurprize. Were an individual to make ſuch a barefaced avowal of all want of principle, but one comment could be made. Even ſo, ſhould we ſay, did the intereſt of Mackheath require, that he ſhould take your purſe: even ſo did the intereſt of Peachum require, that the ſucceſsful highwayman ſhould find at leaſt a temporary aſylum.

Topics of juſtification urged by Lewis.

BUT though ambition be ſo entirely maſter of the will of Lewis, that it could lead him to violate the law of nations, and the faith of treaties, by invading the rights of his neighbours; could urge him to contaminate the dignity of his crown, by a formal diſavowal of any principle but intereſt; yet has it not ſo perfectly ſubdued his underſtanding, as to prevent him from being conſcious of his crime; ſo thoroughly extinguiſhed all ſenſe of ſhame, as to make him neglect,

if it were poſſible to find, any means of juſtification. His topics are drawn from the conduct of other nations; from his own obſervance of the Treaty of Utrecht; and from the deſperate attempts of ſome deſperate individuals among ourſelves.

Topic I. The conduct of other nations.

"My conduct," ſays Lewis, "was juſt and pru-"dent." In ſupport of the aſſertion, he adds, that "it was followed by moſt of the other commercial "States of Europe."

Not true in point of fact.

WHAT! did the other commercial States of Europe declare, that the Colonies had ceaſed to be our Colonies? were emancipated from all ſubjection to the crown of Great Britain? were entitled to a participation in all the privileges due to independent States? For this is the conduct, which the inſolence of Lewis calleth—*juſt and prudent.* Let him go out of his own juſt and prudent family, and he cannot point out a ſingle State that has followed his conduct.

Contradicted by Franklyn.

WHAT a pity it is that Lewis and his new allies have not adjuſted their tale ſo as to hold one conſiſtent language! But ſo it is; while Lewis tells you his example was followed by the other States of Europe; Franklyn, whoſe intereſt, at that moment, led him to ſtate things as they were, was holding a very different language at Verſailles. Hear his own words.

"A MAJORITY (of the Americans, ſays he) have "indeed put in for the prize of independency. They "have done it *on a confidence, that France, attentive to* "*her moſt important intereſts, would ſoon give them open* "*and effectual ſupport.* But when they find themſelves "diſappointed; when they ſee *ſome of the Powers of* "*Europe furniſh troops to aſſiſt in their ſubjugation; ano-*"*ther Power proſcribing their commerce, and the reſt*

"*looking*

" *looking on as indifferent ſpectators*; it is very probable, " that, deſpairing of foreign aid, and ſeverely preſt by " their enemies and their own internal wants and " diſtreſſes, they may be inclined to accept of ſuch " terms, as it will be the intereſt and diſpoſition of " the Britiſh government to grant them [d]."——Is this to follow the example of Lewis? Is to furniſh men for the *ſubjugation* of rebels; is to *prohibit the commerce of rebels*; is even to remain *indifferent ſpectators*, the ſame as to acknowledge the rights of rebels; to give them new privileges; to raiſe them to a new rank? Let this part of the memorial, my countrymen, be deeply engraven on your memory. It does not barely give the moſt direct contradiction to Lewis, but it opens to you a perſpective—which at every ſtep will widen on the eye—of the treachery of Lewis; of the original deſign of the rebels in America; of the madneſs—to uſe no harſher term—of their protectors here; of the art with which the Court of Verſailles has made them all ſubſervient to its own ambitious views.

Topic II. His obſervance of the Treaty of Utrecht,

But though the conduct of other nations will not ſerve to juſtify the conduct of Lewis, he does not deſpair. Still his conduct was juſt and prudent; and that for this deciſive reaſon. He made it a point ſcrupulouſly to adhere to the Treaty of Utrecht.

which yet he broke by harbouring pirates,

Would you not think, my countrymen, that the Treaty of Utrecht contained ſome relaxation of the law of nations, with reſpect to the treatment of pirates; ſome ſtipulations in their favour; ſome regulations preſcribing the mode in which they were there-

[d] Taken from the Memorial delivered by Franklyn at the Court of Verſailles in the year 1777. A part of this Memorial, and a part only, is printed in Almon's Regiſter, vol. ix. p. 51, &c.

after to be treated? So far is this from being the caſe, that the treaty expreſsly enforces the law of nations; expreſsly declares, "that the contracting parties ſhall "not receive any *pirates* into any of their ports or "havens, cities or towns; nor permit them to be re-"ceived, harboured, protected, or aſſiſted[e]." And you know, my countrymen, that by the law of nations, and in the language of treaties, they are *pirates*, who, without any commiſſion from a lawful, acknowledged, Prince, or State, commit hoſtilities by ſea.

and by trading directly with the Colonies.

WOULD you not think, my countrymen, that the Treaty of Utrecht had allowed France to carry on a direct trade with our Colonies under certain reſtrictions and limitations? So far from it, all direct traffic with our Colonies is a direct violation of the treaty. By that treaty, the goods and merchandiſes which the ſubjects of the contracting parties might reciprocally bring into their reſpective ports and countries, are expreſsly deſcribed. They are to be ſuch only "the "trade and importation whereof ſhould not be pro-"hibited by the laws of either kingdom."—Having thus provided againſt the violation of the laws of the country into which goods were to be imported, the treaty, in more general and comprehenſive terms, provides againſt the violation of the laws of either kingdom in any way:——"The laws and ſtatutes of each "kingdom," ſays the Treaty, "ſhall remain in full "force, and ſhall duly be put in execution, whether "they relate to *commerce and navigation*, or to any other "right[f]." Now the laws and ſtatutes of England,

[e] Article XXXV. Treaty of Commerce.
[f] Article V. ditto.

which

which relate to commerce and navigation, expreſsly prohibited all direct commerce between the Colonies and any other State, Power, or Kingdom. A treaty of direct commerce with America was, then, a direct violation of the Treaty of Utrecht.

To which of the two treaties of Utrecht then, and to what article, does Lewis allude? Is it to that, by which the contracting parties engage "to promote the "intereſt, honour, and advantage each of the other [g]?" Or to that, by which they engage, that "neither will "cauſe or ſuffer to be done, or given to the other, any "hoſtility, enmity, moleſtation, or hindrance, either "by themſelves or by others, ſecretly or openly, di-"rectly or indirectly, under colour of right or by way "of fact [h]?" No; theſe articles can ſcarcely be alleged in excuſe for inciting and fomenting a rebellion. Does he allude to the article, by which France recogniſed the lands ceded by her in America to belong to the crown of Great Britain for ever [i]? That would be an odd reaſon to aſſign for an attempt to diſmember them from the crown of Great Britain. He ſeems to allude to the 15th article of the Treaty of Commerce. But that is inapplicable: for it ſpeaks expreſsly of "*foreign privateers, not being ſubjects of one or other of* "*the Confederates*, having commiſſions from any *other* "Prince or State, *in enmity* with either nation [k]." How then can he poſſibly apply this article to the pirates of America? Were they not ſubjects of one of the Confederates? From what other Prince or State had they commiſſions?

The article to which Lewis alludes is either inapplicable,

[g] Article I. Treaty of Peace. [h] Article III. ditto.
[i] Article XII. ditto. [k] See Treaty of Commerce, Art. XV.

or, if applied, is a repetition, not a repetition, of the inſult.

THERE is indeed one anſwer to theſe queſtions, and, as from Lewis all things are poſſible, it may be poſſible, that he meant to give this anſwer. Perhaps he meant to ſay—"They had their commiſſions from the "*United States of North America.*"—In truth, if he means to apply the article in queſtion, this muſt be his anſwer. He has no other. Do you feel, my countrymen! all the force of the inſolence, all the poignancy of the contempt, with which ſuch an anſwer treats you? Your charge againſt him is—that to rebels in arms he granted all the privileges of independent States. What is his defence? He ſays, he gave them only the aſſiſtance, which a treaty allowed him to give to a foreign enemy. That is, he defends himſelf from the charge by a reiterated avowal of it. Inſtead of repairing, he repeats, the inſult. Nay he goes farther: he even aſſumes merit to himſelf, becauſe he did not, he ſays, do more for them.

But he did not obſerve it;

WHEN a man is ſo driven as to be forced to urge ſuch an excuſe as this, one would expect at leaſt, that the excuſe, in point of fact, ſhould be true. But in the preſent caſe, the defence is as untrue in point of fact, as it is inſolent in point of argument. Waving for a moment this unanſwerable objection, that by the law of nations, and in the language of treaties, the American privateers were pirates; and could not therefore be conſidered in the ſame light as privateers commiſſioned by lawful Sovereigns, or acknowledged States; yet, in fact, it is not true, that his treatment of them was regulated by the ſtipulations of the Treaty of Utrecht. For, by the very article in queſtion, it is expreſsly provided, that foreign privateers "ſhall "not, *in any manner whatever*, exchange either ſhips

"or merchandizes, or other ladings; neither ſhall they "be allowed *even to purchaſe victuals*, except ſuch as "ſhall be neceſſary for their going to the next port of "that Prince from whom they have commiſſions." Will he pretend that theſe ſtipulations were obſerved? Were not the prizes taken by theſe pirates, publicly ſold in the ports of France? Were not arms and ammunition publicly ſhipped for the uſe of the Americans, from Nantz, from Bourdeaux, from every port in France[l]? Were not French ſhips of war publicly ſold to the Agent of the Americans? Were they not fitted out in the ports of France, armed from the arſenals of France, manned with the ſubjects of France[m]? Did not Franklyn, openly, in the face of the Court of Verſailles, diſtribute commiſſions from the pretended States to any adventurers that would aſk for them[n]? Were not agents ſent from France to treat with the Congreſs, and to incite them to continue in rebellion[o]? Did not the commanders of the French ſhips, did not the governors of the French iſlands, declare themſelves bounden to protect the commerce, the navigation, the veſſels of the Americans[p]? Were they not *ſaluted* in the ports of France, by the commanders of the forts and the ſquadrons[q]?

"Be it ſo," ſays Lewis: "ſuppoſe all this to be "true; yet why muſt I be reſponſible? I did what "depended upon me: I iſſued my orders forbidding

only left the King of Great Britain to *enforce* the obſervance of it.

l See Remembrancer, vol. i. p. 176. Vol. iii. p. 333. 343. 262. 22. Vol. v. p. 142.

m Ib. vol. iii. p. 343. Vol. iv. p. 138. Vol. v. p. 131. 141. 246. 273. 229. 367. 371.

n This fact is too well known to need a voucher.

o See Remembrancer, vol. ii. p. 347.

p Ib. vol. iii. p. 22. Vol. iv. p. 223.

q Ib. vol. v. p. 367.

"theſe

"these enormities; forbidding the exportation of "arms and warlike ſtores: forbidding my ſubjects to "purchaſe the prizes taken by the Americans. Nay, "I did more, I threatened them with confiſcation. "Nay, I went farther ſtill: I *permitted* the King of "England to repreſs ſuch of my ſubjects as ſhould be "found contravening my orders.—Provided always, "that he did not go one inch beyond what the rules laid "down in treaties, and the laws and uſages of the ſea, "would have given him a right to do without my "permiſſion."—Indeed! This laſt was ſurely kind! To leave our King at full liberty to employ, in repreſſing the abettors of rebellion and piracy, the very ſame means, which the rules laid down in ſubſiſting treaties, the laws and uſage of the ſea, permitted him to uſe in repreſſing the abettors of a legitimate enemy! Do you not, feel, my countrymen, the whole weight of this obligation? Are you not overwhelmed by it? How unreaſonable was the Court of London not to be ſatisfied! With what a modeſt dignity does the mighty Lewis adopt the ſtyle which has ever diſtinguiſhed the Houſe of Bourbon! Who but muſt feel with him—"That this was an act of *remarkable condeſcenſion*[1]!"

His *public* orders annulled by *private* inſtructions.

But however we may differ in opinion here, one thing was clear: his orders, his *public orders*, his public *threats* of confiſcation, accompanied this moſt gracious permiſſion to the King! True, they did. And Lewis ſays—"They had *their effect*."—Certainly they produced all the effect He meant them to produce. What the effect really has been, we all very well know. What He meant it to be, we ſhould have known, with more preciſion, had it pleaſed Lewis, at the ſame time that he ſtated his public orders, to have

[1] Une *complaiſance* marquée,

recited

recited his *private instructions*, by which his subjects were told to regard the public orders as matters of form; the public threats as *Bruta fulmina*: had he laid before us, in particular, a copy of that remarkable private instruction, which so well interpreted his public orders, and which directed the keepers of the royal stores to furnish from the *royal arsenal military stores*, to be sent to America, in pursuance of the *contract between Beaumarchais and the Congress*; had he furnished us with copies of the memorials, and contra-memorials, between the Agent of Lewis and the Members of Congress; by which Lewis contended that he had *sold* these military stores as an honest merchant, and they, that he had *given* them as a generous ally.

Topic III. The conduct of individuals in England.

ALL these Lewis has prudently suppressed. Not that they would not well have accounted for the acknowledged inattention to his public orders; but that he chose to rest the point upon another ground; on the impossibility of securing obedience to them. Of this impossibility, with all the bitterness of sarcasm he adds, the King of England cannot complain; since, "notwithstanding a formal act of parliament, his "Majesty could not prevent his own merchants from "furnishing goods, and even warlike stores, to the "Colonies."

Shame reflected by this topic on a certain set of men;

AND here, my countrymen, we must, for once, acknowledge the superiority of Lewis. We must devour the bitterness of the sarcasm. We cannot refute the opprobrious assertion; we can only blush at the truth of it. But, if the cup be bitter to us, what must it be to the men, upon whom their *friend*, their *ally*, has stampt this mark of infamy! What to those among our countrymen who protected and supported them!

them! If they are made of penetrable matter; if they have any feeling left, how muſt the barbed arrow, he has planted in their breaſt, rankle, and feſter, and corrode!

Compared to the orators of Athens.

It is painful to make, but truth extorts, the confeſſion. There are among us a ſet of men, like the abandoned orators of Athens, damned by the eloquence of Demoſthenes to eternal fame, who ſeem to have ſold themſelves to the enemies of their country; who—"neglecting the public intereſts, ſeek to "promote their own reputation, by running headlong "into trials, confiſcations, accuſings; who labour to "eſtabliſh their own power, by their accuſations and "invectives againſt thoſe at the head of affairs; arm-"ing, by theſe means, one part of the ſtate againſt the "other; and leaving the enemy, mean while, the full "power of contriving and acting as he pleaſes[9]."

Manner in which Lewis might addreſs them.

Were Lewis preſent at the conſultations of theſe men, he would not take upon him to *adviſe* them: he would ſee that nothing could be more favourable to his views, than the meaſures they have already adopted. He would expreſs only the feelings of gratitude; ſpeak only the language of applauſe. Perhaps he might addreſs them in terms like theſe:

"It gives me pleaſure to find myſelf in the midſt "of my friends, my allies: for ſuch I account you; "as ſuch you will ever be dear to me. Your un-"guarded expreſſions firſt tempted the Americans to "revolt: your conduct confirmed them in it. Your "declarations have hurried them to acts, which have, "I truſt, rendered all return impoſſible. Nor have

[9] See the Third Philippic. And the Oration on the State of Cherſoneſus.

"deeds

"deeds been wanting to confirm your words. You "have rivalled me in your zeal to assist them against "your country, with arms and military stores. Fear- "ing that your united efforts would still be ineffec- "tual, you laboured incessantly to procure them my "assistance. The inviting picture you drew of your "weakness; the welcome avowal of your total ina- "bility to defend yourselves, should I take part with "the Americans; disposed me secretly to aid them. "The air of inspiration, with which you foretold, "that I should soon openly avow them; the gloomy "pleasure with which you dwelt on that defenceless "state, to which such a step would reduce you; the "malicious joy with which you pointed out the ad- "vantages I should reap from it; the madness with "which you marked the places where Great Britain "is most weak and vulnerable, enabled me to hasten "your prediction. I openly declared in favour of "America. This declaration added new fervour to "your zeal. From that moment the description of "your weakness became more pointed; the picture of "your distresses more gloomy; the impediments "thrown in the way of every active effort more fre- "quent; the attempts to check the ardour of the "people more daring; voluntary offers of assistance "towards the defence of your country were either "artfully vilified as proceeding from base motives; "or judiciously scouted as repugnant to law. In the "British House of Commons I distinguish one pe- "culiar friend. His debts had been discharged, his "extravagancies had, for years, been supported by "the voluntary contributions of the Public. Not

" even gratitude to that Public could check the energy " of his courage, or damp the ardour of his zeal, in " my ſervice. In a critical moment in the Houſe of " Commons, he declared, that voluntary contri- " butions, that the free and liberal ſubſcriptions of " the people, might indeed be legally employed in " ſupport of the chief of a faction; but if applied to " the conſtitution; to the defence of the crown; to " the preſervation of the lives and the property of the " community at large, they inſtantly became unwar- " rantable and illegal[t]. You have all, indeed, been " ſteady to my intereſts. It was owing to your joint " efforts, that, during the greater part of a long ſeſ- " ſion of Parliament, the attention of both Houſes was " ſo judiciouſly called, from the means of providing for " the public defence, to groundleſs criminations, " and futile enquiries. To your joint efforts was it " owing, that, when the public buſineſs was ſuffered " to ſteal, as it were, a moment's attention, that mo- " ment was employed to ſtrengthen me and my allies. " The ſame declarations were made, the ſame lan- " guage holden, and with the ſame ſucceſs, to induce " Spain to join with me, as you at firſt employed to " induce me to take part with America. The event " you predicted with confidence. The intereſts of " Spain you declared to require it. And ſucceſs to " *our Houſe*, becauſe ruin to your country, you pro- " nounced to be the natural, the unavoidable reſult. " I thank you for your zeal. It has done me—to uſe " a phraſe of your own—*knight's ſervice*. Your " ſpeeches have been carefully printed and induſtri-

[t] See Almon's Parliamentary Debates, vol. ix. p. 98, &c.

" ouſly

" ouſly propagated [u]. They were not all ſpoken by men
" of deſperate fortunes, or of ruined fame. There are
" ſome among you who ſtand, in point of fortune and
" of fame, on a higher ground than a W..... or a
" B... in one place; than an A... or a C.. in
" another. Theſe ſeaſonable harangues my people
" have read with all the greedineſs of curioſity, and re-
" ceived with all the devotion of credulity. My Mi-
" niſters have ſeized the advantage. Affecting to
" give into the popular deluſion, they have rouzed the
" ſpirit, and inflamed the ardour, of my people: my
" levies have filled; my armaments been equipped,
" with a celerity unknown. To you, my friends,
" and to your aſſociate, Franklyn, I owe this advan-
" tage. He aſſured my people—and you have kindly
" confirmed his aſſertion—*that now is the moſt favour-*
" *able opportunity ever offered to any nation of humbling*
" *a powerful, arrogant, and hereditary enemy. An oppor-*
" *tunity which no human wiſdom could have produced,*
" *and which the moſt zealous of our patriots could ſcarce*
" *have hoped* [w].—My obligations to you are too great
" for expreſſion. My diſtinguiſhed champion has
" made the meaſure over-run. Publicly, in the aſſem-
" bly of your repreſentatives, he ſtood up, and boldly
" declared, what none of the penſioners of my great
" anceſtor, in the venal parliament of Charles, would
" have dared to declare—" *That the law of nations*
" *clearly juſtifies my conduct.*" " *That my conduct re-*

[u] Beſides the Retailers of Sedition in Engliſh, there is a man who formerly was, if he is not now, in the ſervice of the King; who, in conjunction with ſome French ſpies, ſet up a French paper, in which all theſe ſpeeches were careſully detailed; and which, at no ſmall expence, was circulated by Monſ. de Sartine in all parts of Europe.

[w] See Franklyn's Memorial to the Court of France.

"*ceives the fulleſt juſtification from the conduct of other* "*courts.*" "*That throughout I have acted according to* "*the law of nations*[x]."—

Painful view.

SUCH I conceive would be the addreſs of Lewis to a certain ſet of men among us. If, conſcious that they deſerve ſuch an addreſs, they can yet ſpeak peace to their breaſts, I envy them not—they are not Britons;—but the ſight is too painful, too humiliating. The inſolence of an enemy lights the fire of indignation in the eye: the treachery of a countryman ſears the eye-balls. Let us return to the Manifeſto.

Review of the picture given by Lewis of himſelf.

HITHERTO at leaſt, his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty has not placed himſelf in a very reſpectable point of view. He has drawn his own character: Is it that of a great, a juſt, a diſintereſted Prince? No ſuch features appear. What, then, are the ruling traits? That he leagued with Rebels in one part of his Majeſty's dominions; and joined in the intrigues of, what himſelf deſcribes to be, a *lawleſs* faction, in another. He admitted the Americans to a participation in the advantages enjoyed by independent nations; becauſe they took up arms againſt their lawful ſovereign: he furniſhed, and permitted his ſubjects to furniſh, them with ſhips, arms, ammunition, men; becauſe a deſperate faction in England, evading the laws of their country, in defiance of a formal act of Parliament, furniſhed them likewiſe with goods and warlike ſtores. This is his own account of his own conduct.

More dignity to be expected in the reaſons for the treaty of alliance.

BUT, perhaps, as he goes on he may riſe in our eſteem. The motives which induced him to "ſign

[x] See the Speech of Mr. Wilkes. Almon, vol. ix. p. 106, et ſeq.

"a treaty

"a treaty of *friendſhip and commerce*, with his new "allies, to ſerve as a foundation for their mutual "good correſpondence;" the reaſons which urged him to convert this treaty of friendſhip and commerce into a treaty of *alliance offenſive and defenſive*, "by "taking at the ſame time other *eventual meaſures* in "concert with thoſe allies," may, perhaps, have ſomething more noble, more manly. If they do not give us the moſt favourable notions of his juſtice, they may yet reſtore him, in the eye of ambition at leaſt, to that dignity from which, in the beginning of this tranſaction, he appears to be ſo miſerably fallen. He ſtands now upon a different footing; for, to ſecure ſucceſs to his former intrigues, he was bound to conceal them: to give effect to his former engagements, he was forced to deny or explain them away. So far, then, his conduct could not but be marked with duplicity; and duplicity is the child of cunning and meanneſs. But this treaty, be it only of friendſhip and commerce, or of alliance offenſive and defenſive, was to be openly avowed, and publicly juſtified; juſtified not only to the court of London, but to every court of Europe. Here then we may expect him to aſſume the appearance, at leaſt, of dignity. He may, perhaps, continue to ſhock the virtue, but he will, ſurely, ceaſe to trifle with the underſtanding, of the Princes and States whom he addreſſes.

Diſappointments; ſome of them ridiculous;

LITTLE do you know of the Houſe of Bourbon, my countrymen, if you have formed ſuch expectations as theſe. The Manifeſto proceeds as it began. The ſame ſpirit of low cunning pervades the whole of it. Hence it is, that of the reaſons alleged to juſtify the treaty, ſome, though too true to be diſputed, are yet too

too ridiculous to be anſwered. Thus it ſeems "the "ſtyle of our Letters of Marque was *really offenſive*."—They wanted, I ſuppoſe, the high poliſh, which alone could have made them tolerable to the *delicateſſe* of a French ear; and we are ready to allow that the language of John Bull is ſometimes coarſe and homely. At other times, it ſeems, our court wounded the dignity of the French Ambaſſador, "by affecting the moſt *of-* "*fenſive ſilence* to the greater part of his *official* repre- "ſentations."—And here again we are ready to allow, that one diſtinguiſhing feature in the character of John Bull is *taciturnity*. Impertinent loquacity may ſometimes move his ſpleen, but ſeldom excites him to gratify the pruriency of the babler's ear. Again we learn that "the court of London put the *patience* and *magna-* "*nimity* of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty to the moſt "*painful* proofs."—Nor on this head will we diſpute with him. His patience, his magnanimity are, we are ready to allow, of ſo weak, ſo rickety a conſtitution, that they ſhould be managed very tenderly. The ſlighteſt proofs will give them pain.—To the full weight of all theſe reaſons Lewis is moſt heartily welcome.

others unſupported by proof;

OTHER reaſons are aſſigned, which want only one ſlight circumſtance to give them real weight. That circumſtance is *Proof*. Thus his Majeſty is charged in general terms, with having—"violated the faith of "treaties"—"Diſturbed, under the moſt frivolous and "abſurd pretences, the commerce and navigation of "France[y]"—"Arrogated a tyrannical dominion on

y This part Lewis explains; the *commerce and navigation*, of which he ſpeaks, he acknowledges to be a direct commerce and navigation with our Colonies. This, we have ſeen, was forbidden by the treaty of Utrecht. But what are treaties to Lewis? *Intereſt*, he tells us, preſcribes the meaſure of his duty. And it is *frivolous and abſurd* to diſturb his intereſt.

"the

" the high ſeas"—" Preſcribed laws arbitrary, un-
" known, inadmiſſible"—" Inſulted, on many oc-
" caſions, the French flag"—And laſtly—" violated
" the French territories."—And, keeping to general terms, Lewis might have filled volumes in the ſame way. He might have given a liſt of grievances, as numerous as the ſouls which the ambition of his family has hurried to a premature death. But can he be ſo weak as to imagine, that Europe will give any credit to ſuch vague and general aſſertions? Who ſees not, that if theſe grievances had really exiſted, Lewis would have carefully particulariſed the ſeveral caſes; ſtrongly ſupported them by authentic proofs; clearly ſpecified all the circumſtances of time, place, and manner? Not to have done this is a confeſſion, that he could not do it. To ſuch unſupported aſſertions a ſimple denial is, therefore, a full and concluſive anſwer.

others impoſſible.

OTHER reaſons he urges, which could not poſſibly exiſt. Thus he ſays, that " the court of London " encouraged judgments and confiſcations revoltingly " unjuſt, excluding even the means of appeal." But this is to attribute to the court of London a power, which every man in England knows it to be impoſſible for the King, or his Miniſters, to exerciſe. The King, the Miniſtry, have no more influence over the proceedings of the Courts of Admiralty, than they have over the proceedings of any other court, eſtabliſhed for the protection of private property. And that is as much as they have over the Datary's Court at Rome. We all know that there is an eſtabliſhed method of determination, whether any capture be, or be not, lawful prize: that this method is conformable to the maritime law of nations; not novel, or of modern date, but the

the ſame which has been immemorially obſerved, during all our preceding wars. We all know, that the captor cannot diſpoſe either of ſhip or cargo, till there has been a regular, judicial, proceeding and ſentence, in a Court of Admiralty, wherein both parties may be heard. We all know, that the proceedings in theſe courts are fixed and permanent; and their judgments framed according to the law of nations, and the tenor of the treaties ſubſiſting between the courts of the reſpective ſuitors. We all know too, that there is a ſuperior Court of Review, conſiſting of perſons eminent for their rank and abilities, to which the parties, who think themſelves aggrieved by the judgment of the inferior court, may of right appeal. How then could the King, or his Miniſters, encourage judgments or confiſcations revoltingly unjuſt? How could they exclude the means of appeal? Or would Lewis have carried the appeal to France? He has already betrayed ſo total an ignorance of the law of nations, and ſo thorough a contempt for the tenor of treaties, that I ſhould ſuſpect this to be the ground of his complaint. He perhaps may not know, that it is a maxim univerſally and immemorially received, in the maritime law of nations, that the proper, regular courts for the trying queſtions of prizes, are the courts of that ſtate to whom the *captor* belongs. He perhaps does not know, that this manner of trial is recognized, ſupported, inforced by many treaties [z]. Of all this he muſt have

[z] See the Report of Sir George Lee (then Judge of the Prerogative Court), Doctor Paul (then his Majeſty's Advocate General), Sir Dudley Ryder and Mr. Murray (then his Majeſty's Attorney and Solicitor General), given in the year 1753, upon the "*Expoſition des Motifs*," &c. of the King of Pruſſia; with the authorities there cited.

been ignorant, or he could not have been ſo abſurd, as to talk of "the King or his Miniſters encouraging "confiſcations, or excluding the means of appeal." It is a charge which could not poſſibly exiſt. It might as well be brought againſt the Emperor of Germany, or the Pope of Rome, as againſt the King of Great Britain, or his Miniſters.

THE futility of theſe reaſons we may charitably impute to ignorance or inadvertence. But when Lewis takes upon him to fix the preciſe moment, when he firſt determined to ſign this treaty; when he adds,—"that in oppoſition to his moſt preſſing intereſts, he "had hitherto declined *all the overtures* made to him by "the United States of North America;"—another anſwer is required; an anſwer, which, like the language of the letters of marque, may ſhock his delicacy; may appear to him—"really offenſive."—*The mighty Monarch aſſerts the thing which is not.* I will not miſpend your time, my countrymen, or abuſe your patience, by a needleſs accumulation of proofs, on a point ſo notorious [a]. One proof may ſtand us in the ſtead of thouſands. It ſhall be drawn from authority, to which he, at leaſt, cannot object. From the memorial of Dr. Franklyn.

other falſe;

FRANKLYN ſhall prove to you, my countrymen, that ſo far from rejecting *all the overtures* made to him by the rebels in America, he had received them, liſtened to them, promiſed to accede to them; and waited only for the moſt advantageous moment of acceding to them openly. "It ſeems," ſays the hoary traitor [b], "to be "the *preſent* determination of France, and by ſome

and contradicted by Franklyn.

[a] The facts recited in the laſt pages are a full anſwer to this aſſertion.

[b] See the Memorial in the Appendix.

" it has been thought a wiſe determination, to *avoid*, " *for a time*, *all open interference* in the preſent con- " teſt between Great Britain and the Anglo-Ame- " rican Colonies; from a preſumption that the for- " mer will ſo far exhauſt herſelf, as to give France " an opportunity of more *advantageouſly beginning* " *a war at a later period*. This ſyſtem of policy, how- " ever, is too refined and dangerous to be any longer " purſued by a wiſe and *provident adminiſtration*." Is it poſſible that Franklyn could have holden this language to the court of Verſailles, if Lewis had hitherto declined *all the overtures* made to him from the Anglo-American Colonies? Could he have holden it, if Lewis had not received them favourably; liſtened to them with attention; acceded to them, in effect; deferring his public avowal of that acceſſion only till a more advantageous moment of beginning a war? Did Franklyn ſpeak truth? What name, then, ſhall we give to the language of Lewis? Did Franklyn ſay the thing which was not, impeaching the veracity, aſperſing the honour, of Lewis? Why then was he ſuffered to remain in France? or out of the Baſtile?

True reaſons aſſigned.

WHEN Lewis acknowledges, that he ſigned the treaty at *this particular moment*, becauſe at this particular moment *his intereſt* required him to ſign it; *both that he might defeat, and render ineffectual, the plan formed at London of a coalition with America*; *and that he might prevent the King from uniting the whole force of the empire to revenge the inſults offered him by France*; the ſpirit of truth is upon him. Like Balaam the ſon of Beor, he ſpeaketh not what he willeth, but what the ſpirit ſayeth, even that doth he ſpeak. To ſeparate the Colonies from the Mother Country had been the firſt

object

object of his reign. To prevent their re-union was ſtill the great object of his ambition. To guard againſt chaſtiſement was the natural dictate of a guilty conſcience.

Lights to be drawn from them,

BUT the knowledge of this one fact, of the motives by which France was actuated in ſigning this treaty, is not the only advantage we ſhould derive from this unexpected, this miraculous, deviation of Lewis into the track of truth. His avowal juſtifies our interpretation of the preceding parts of the Manifeſto; and it gives you that clear and perfect conviction, which I told you, my countrymen, you would gradually receive, that the rebels in America, their agent at Paris, and their partiſans in England, *have all* been induſtriouſly—though ſome I hope blindly—labouring to gratify the ambition of Lewis.

when compared with Franklyn's Memorial, and the conduct of the abettors of America here.

LET us compare this part of the Manifeſto with the Memorial of Franklyn, and with the language, and the conduct, of the abettors of the rebellious Americans at home. Thoſe "who put in for the prize of inde-"pendency, did it," ſays Franklyn, "*on a confidence* "*that France, attentive to her moſt important intereſts,* "*would give them open and effectual ſupport.*" Attentive to her intereſts, France, we have ſeen, did give them ſupport; and though that ſupport was not yet openly *avowed* by Lewis, yet, in fact, it was *given* ſo openly, that Franklyn roundly tells the Court of Verſailles—"The King and Miniſtry of Great Britain *already* "*know, that France has encouraged and aſſiſted the Colo-*"*niſts in their preſent reſiſtance.*" As roundly does Franklyn tell them, that the information received by the King and the Miniſtry of Great Britain, was

founded on fact. "*In truth,*" ſays he, "*France has* "*done too much, unleſs ſhe intends to do more. Without* "*giving the Coloniſts effectual aſſiſtance, it would have* "*been better to leave them wholly unaſſiſted.*" The abettors of the rebellion at home thought, too, with Franklyn, that they had already done too much, unleſs they intended to do more. And therefore, not contented with encouraging the rebels by their letters and their ſpeeches; with ſtrengthening them by declamations, which did every thing but formally invite the aſſiſtance of France; they went farther; and as their then partner[c], their now friend and ally, the mighty Lewis, informs us, "notwithſtanding a formal act of "parliament, *they too furniſhed goods and warlike ſtores* "*to the Coloniſts.*" Things were in this ſituation, in the year 1777, when Franklyn preſented his Memorial to the Court of France. The diſgraceful ſurrender at Saratoga either had not happened, or was not known: it was impoſſible to foreſee or to expect it. It was impoſſible to foreſee or to expect, that the Commanders in Chief of ſuch gallant, well-diſciplined fleets and armies ſhould, from ignorance or indolence, from love of pleaſure or a luſt of riches, ſuffer ſuch fleets and ſuch armies, either to languiſh in—*to the public unprofitable*—idleneſs; or to periſh in the raſh purſuit of ill-concerted operations. It was not poſſible to foreſee or to expect, that an uninviting difficulty of acceſs, a forbidding coldneſs of reſerve, a revolting haughtineſs of pride, ſhould be employed to alienate the affections, which, as Commiſſioners, it was the duty of theſe Com-

[c] At that time Lewis was only a *Merchant*. He *ſold* arms and ammunition. The ferme was, I believe, "*Beaumarchais and Co.*" It ſhould have been "Lewis, Oppoſition, and Co."

manders

manders to conciliate. It was not poſſible to foreſee or to expect, that men of their rank and eſtimation ſhould act, as if the only ſtruggle with them was, whether they could render themſelves moſt fatal to their country, in their civil or in their military capacity. The rebels in America trembled; the deluded people were opening their eyes. He did it unwillingly, but ſtill Franklyn did avow, we had ground to hope, "that "victories might be obtained; that theſe on the one "hand, and the wants and diſtreſſes of the Coloniſts "on the other, might induce them to return again to "a *dependence, more or leſs limited, on Great Britain.*" Unwillingly he allowed, but ſtill he did allow, "there "were *many* among the Coloniſts, who might even "then be ſatisfied with a limited *ſubjection to the Bri-* "*tiſh Crown.*" Theſe diſpoſitions Franklyn ſaw would be fatal to his own perſonal purſuits; death to the cauſe of rebellion. And he therefore urged the Court of France, "*as the only means left to prevent the* "*Coloniſts from being ſhortly reconciled to Great Britain,* "*to enter immediately into ſuch engagements with them, as* "*would neceſſarily preclude all others; and enable them,* "*as well to repel the attacks, as to ſpurn all the offers, of* "*Britain.*" And this advice he enforced by every argument that could fire the ambition, or alarm the fears, of Lewis. He exhorted him "not to loſe the "moſt favourable opportunity, ever offered to any na- "tion, *of humbling a powerful, arrogant, and hereditary* "*enemy.*" He forewarned him, "that it was not ſim- "ply the opportunity of *reducing Great Britain*, which "he would loſe, by his then preſent inactivity; that "his own ſafety, and all his American poſſeſſions,

" would be endangered, the moment in which a re-
" conciliation ſhould take place between Britain and
" America." And he foretold him, that both Britain and America would be equally hoſtile to him; as it was " already intimated, that, equally hoſtile to both " parties, he fomented the preſent war, only to make " them mutual inſtruments of each others deſtruction." Franklyn, we ſee, was zealous in the ſervice of Lewis. Oppoſition ſtood forth his rival. The part, which a prudent member of the Britiſh ſenate, which a real patriot, would have taken, in ſuch a ſituation, was ſecretly to cheriſh the friendly diſpoſitions in America; to ſilence, for a moment, his reſentment againſt France; to appear even blind to the cauſes ſhe had given of offence: and ſuch, Dr. Franklyn informs the Court of Verſailles, was the conduct *of the Britiſh Miniſtry*. Oppoſition, on the other hand, took a very different line. They avowed, as Franklyn tells the Court of Verſailles, the intentions, which he ſuppoſed, in " their debates on Lord Chatham's motion." " And " even the *temperate* Lord Camden," he ſays, " con-
" cluded a long and much applauded ſpeech, in the " Houſe of Peers, by fervently wiſhing for a peace " with America, and *a war with all the world*." And leſt theſe public declarations ſhould not produce their full effect, from the ſame Franklyn we learn, that the reality of the intentions he ſuppoſes, was confirmed by PRIVATE INTELLIGENCE. The account given by " the Britiſh adherents in America" of the views and the conduct of Lewis, was perfectly true. Equally hoſtile to both parties, he certainly wiſhed to make them inſtruments of their mutual deſtruction.

And

And therefore, though he had determined to declare openly in favour of the rebels, he wiſhed to defer it till the wants and diſtreſſes, ſo feelingly painted by Franklyn, ſhould leave him maſter of the terms on which he ſhould make that declaration. Meanwhile, he was arming in all his ports; "and making ſuch "diſpoſitions as might enable him—not to prevent the "evil deſigns of his enemies;" but—to give ſucceſs to his own evil deſigns, to enſure impunity to his own depredations. For an avowal of this fact, we are indebted to his vanity. For, having complained, good Prince! of the preparations and "armaments making "in England," and which his conſcience told him "could not have America for their object:" having, with tears and tremblings, repreſented "the *immenſity* "of theſe preparations, and the *aſtoniſhing precipitation* "with which they were redoubled, in all the ports of "England;" vanity ſtept in; took off the maſk, and impelled him to boaſt, that, notwithſtanding this immenſity, and this precipitation, he had taken the ſtart of us. "It is notorious," ſays he, "that the forces "of France were ready to act *before thoſe of England.*" Thus prepared for every event, he waited till the miſfortunes and miſconduct of our commanders began to fix his wavering reſolution; till the certainty that a plan of conciliation was formed at London—of which no doubt his *good friends* among a certain ſet of men gave him early, *and private, intelligence*—finally determined him to declare openly in favour of the rebels. "Then, and not till then, he ſigned the treaty;" and he owns that he ſigned it—"*to defeat and render ineffectual the plan of a coalition formed at London*;" and "to prevent the King from rallying all the forces of

"the

" the crown," for the chaſtiſement of a conduct, which his own conſcience told him could never merit, and which the Memorial of Franklyn and the ſpeeches of Oppoſition aſſured him could never obtain, forgiveneſs.

Uniformity in the character of Lewis,

HERE then you have the picture of Lewis, drawn a ſecond time by his own hand, and placed in another point of view. Are the features ennobled? Do you yet diſcern any traits of dignity, any look of Majeſty? No. He is *ſemper idem*. He appears at this ſecond, as at the firſt period, neither more nor leſs than the little partizan of a deſperate faction; the cunning abettor of an unprovoked rebellion.

explains other parts of the Manifeſto.

UPON this ground, upon the uniform meanneſs and duplicity of his conduct, Lewis, I ſuppoſe, reſts the ſeemingly grave aſſertions, that " the notification of " his engagements with the Americans was dictated " by principles of juſtice, a ſenſe of honour, and a ſin- " cere deſire of preſerving peace: that nothing could " be *more ſimple*, or *leſs offenſive*, than the Declaration " delivered by his Ambaſſador to the Britiſh Miniſtry." The Declaration was, in plain Engliſh, this—" I " have entered into a treaty with your rebellious ſub- " jects in America, the effects of which will be to " deprive you of advantages you have been acquir- " ing for more than a century; and for the permanent " ſecurity of which, the Agent of the rebels aſſures me, " you increaſed your national debt, during the courſe " of the laſt war only, in the enormous ſum of *fifty* " *millions*. This communication of the treaty, and " this avowal of its expected operation, I deſire you to " conſider as a new proof of my conſtant and ſincere

" diſpoſition for peace. For, if you do not chuſe to " ſee it in this light, the rebels and I have taken other " *eventual meaſures.*"—Coming from Lewis, no doubt, all this was *ſimple*; that is, *perfectly in character.* Coming from any other Prince, who affected the leaſt regard to juſtice or good faith, it might not have been thought quite *ſo ſimple*; nay it might have been thought *offenſive:* other Courts beſides " the Court of St. " James, might have formed the ſame judgment of " it." " It would not have appeared extraordinary, " had it even excited animoſity in the King," " and " had his Majeſty communicated that animoſity to his " parliament and his people." Upon the ſame ground, I ſuppoſe, he reſts the credibility of that other aſſertion, " that he diſpatched a ſquadron to America, under " Count d'Eſtaing, with the *ſole view* of putting him- " ſelf in a ſituation to repel force by force." True it is, that the firſt meſſage of D'Eſtaing, ſignified by the French agent to the Congreſs, declared—" That he " was deſirous of enabling all the armaments, either " public or private, in the United States of North " America, to derive every poſſible advantage from the " operations of his ſquadron, in order to make prizes " of the *common enemy* [d]." To have ſent a commander, with ſuch inſtructions as theſe, would in any other Prince have been called *inviting*, not *repelling*, force by force. But it is quite *ſimple*, and not at all *offenſive* in Lewis.

——Servatur ad imum
Qualis ab inceptu proceſſit.

[d] See Remembrancer, vol. vii. p. 5, &c. Gerard uſes the ſame phraſe at his firſt audience of the Congreſs. England is called the " *Common* " *Enemy:*" and the *eventual* " engagemen's are ſaid to have an *immediate,* " *poſitive, permanent, indiſſoluble force.*"

Lewis appears in a new character.

I PASS over in ſilence "the ſenſible and unexpected "blows," which, he ſays, "he had it in his power" to give us, nay, "in his inclination" to give us; but which, after all, from a ſpirit of humanity, as genuine as his ſenſe of honour, he did not give us. I paſs over the vanity of turning a drawn battle into a victory[e]. I paſs over a ſtring of groundleſs, unſupported complaints; and haſten to preſent him before you, my countrymen, in his laſt and neweſt character. It is not preciſely the character, which, in ſtrictneſs, he ought to have aſſumed; it is not that of the repentant ſinner, anxious to atone for his crimes; but it is a character not abſolutely abhorrent from his ſituation: it approaches to that of a litigant, ready to ſubmit to the judgment of his peers; and reſting his defence on the juſtice of the cauſe. The King of Spain, we are told, offered his mediation: and Lewis "re-"ceived the overture with a ſatisfaction equal to the "wiſhes he had always formed for the maintenance "of peace."

Dignity and conſiſtency to be expected;

AND now, ſurely, the dignity of the drama muſt riſe: we ſhall have no more to do with rebels, or their agents, or their factions. Two Kings are to appear upon the ſtage. Nor is this all. The Rebels and their great and good Ally alternately confirmed, and contradicted, each the other. And it is no wonder; for they were ill-ſorted aſſociates; of intereſts jarring; ranks different; habits incompatible. But the two royal actors are born of the ſame family; united in

[e] Certainly D'Orvilliers was not *victorious*. But no matter. It is not worth the diſpute. At beſt it is feelingly humiliating for an Engliſhman to talk of a Britiſh fleet engaging an inferior enemy, and to be able to claim only the barren boaſt of Ajax—That we were not beaten.

the

the ſame intereſts; accuſtomed to the ſame habits. Now, then, we may reaſonably expect, that to unaffected dignity will be added uniform conſiſtency.

Diſappointment. Variations in the accounts prior to the actual offer of terms.

BLESSED is the man, who expecteth not, for he ſhall not be diſappointed. This is a beatitude which we are not to enjoy, my countrymen; yet again ſhall we find ourſelves grievouſly diſappointed. At the very outſet, and in the repreſentation of every ſtep, prior to the actual propoſal of terms, the royal couſins differ, and indeed nearly contradict each other. Lewis ſpeaks only of the *glimpſe* of a deſire of the mediation of Spain[f]: Charles ſpeaks of a deſire of his *powerful* mediation, *clearly* ſignified: Lewis ſpeaks of this deſire as originating from England: on this point Charles leaves us in the dark; inclining us rather to think, that it originated from France: the firſt ſtep he mentions on the part of Britain, being a veſſel ſent to ſignify the acceptance of a mediation already offered. Lewis repreſents Charles as perfectly indifferent, whether his mediation was accepted or refuſed; Charles repreſents himſelf as anxious in the cauſe, and taking at once the "moſt energetic ſteps" to ſecure ſucceſs to it. Lewis ſays not a word of any differences, which had ariſen, or were likely to ariſe, between Great Britain and Spain; but ſpeaks of the King his uncle as a mediator perfectly diſintereſted: Charles, on the contrary, ſays, from the beginning, he declared, that he had many differences to regulate with the Court of London, and that if the mediation did not ſucceed, he ſhould be obliged to take *his own meaſures:* that is, as his own conduct explains the phraſe—to range himſelf under the banners of France. Lewis ſays, Charles

f. Deſir que la Cour de Londres *laiſſât entrevoir.*

would not *appear* as mediator, till he had previous, clear, and poſitive aſſurances, that his offer would be accepted; and till he knew the principal objects, which were to form the baſis of the negociation: Charles repreſents himſelf as accepting the offer, as ſoon as he *underſtood* it was deſired. Theſe are inconſiſtencies, or at leaſt ſuch ſtriking variations, as do not very ſtrongly prepoſſeſs us in favour of the authenticity of the accounts delivered by the Royal Relators.

Diſappointment. Charles leaves us to gueſs at the terms;

But let us not deſpair. When the Royal Apologiſts come to give an account of the terms of peace actually propoſed by the belligerent powers, and of the meaſures taken by the mediator to reconcile them, we ſhall ſurely be more fortunate. We ſhall ſee them, far from contradicting, mutually explain and ſupport the accounts each of the other. No. Not even this expectation will be fulfilled. In Charles, it ſhould ſeem, ſome lingering ſenſe of ſhame remained. He bluſhed to avow the terms. And he therefore, with becoming reſerve, confines himſelf wholly to generals. "His ſteps were energetic:" "they naturally ſhould "have produced the greateſt effect;" "have brought "the belligerent powers to an accommodation, equally "honourable to both parties." "His expedients "were wiſe; calculated to ſmooth difficulties; and "prevent the calamities of war." All this ſounds pretty on the ear; but is it intelligible? Is it any thing more than mere *ſeſquipedalia verba?* No mortal could have formed a preciſe idea from it, had not Lewis kindly ſtept forth, and expoſed to view, in all their native colours—theſe energetic and productive ſteps—theſe terms of honourable accommodation—theſe wiſe expedients, at the ſight of which difficulties

ſhould have vaniſhed, like mountains at the command of faith.

but Lewis ſpeaks out.

Lewis is a young man. He does not therefore follow the ſage example of his more experienced uncle. He boldly ſpeaks out. And having already convinced us to what a degree he poſſeſſes that high ſenſe of honour, which ſtimulates the ardour, he means to prove his claim to the ſoft flexibility and the ingenuous candour, which give its moſt amiable luſtre to the deportment of youth.—No ſooner was the mediation offered, than he ſtaid his "uplifted hand; accepted the "mediation; ſuſpended the ſailing of his fleet; and "agreed to communicate his conditions of peace, as "ſoon as England ſhould have expreſſed, in poſitive "terms, her deſire of a reconciliation."—How ſmooth is this language! The ſtyle how conciliating! Surely it is not a belligerent power, it muſt be a meſſenger of peace, who addreſſes you!—But what follows?—"In "which reconciliation the United States of America "ſhould be included."

Inſolence of the preliminary, and of the defence of it.

Now, my countrymen, where is the ſoft flexibility, where the ingenuous candour, of the youth? Gone, fled for ever, with his veracity and his honour. What ſhall we ſay to the inſolence of this preliminary, my countrymen? Nothing. You have time neither to feel, nor to expreſs your feelings. Great as is the inſult, daring as the outrage, it is in a moment merged, ſwallowed up, by the yet greater inſult, the yet more daring outrage, of the reaſon advanced in its defence. "Nothing certainly, ſays he, could be more *conform-* "*able* to the *apparent intentions* of the Court of Lon- "don than this reſolution."—I do not fabricate this reaſon for him: I do not put words into his mouth.

Look

Look at the Manifeſto. There, incredible as it may ſeem, there you will find them. What! Shall we be told, in one part of the Manifeſto, that "the King "had announced to his Parliament" the recognition of the independence claimed by his rebellious ſubjects, and the concluſion of a treaty with them upon the foot of Independent States, "as an *act of hoſtility, as* "*a formal and premeditated aggreſſion;*" and in the ſame Manifeſto, within a few lines, ſhall we be told, that without any new reaſon, any change of intervening circumſtances, the recognition of that independence, the allowance of that treaty, "*was per-* "*fectly conformable to the apparent intentions of the Court* "*of London!*" How had theſe intentions appeared? Had not the Commiſſioners, ſent out by the King, refuſed, in conformity to their inſtructions, to treat with the Americans as Independent States? Is this a proof that the reſolution of Lewis was ſo perfectly conformable to the apparent intentions of the Court of London?

Anſwer of the Court of London.

LEWIS does not pretend to have continued long under the dominion of this unaccountable miſtake. The Britiſh Miniſtry, he allows, anſwered in direct terms, "That nothing could be ſaid about a recon- "ciliation, and about peace, till France ſhould have "retracted the declaration ſhe had made in the "month of March of the preceding year." Now then he knew the *real* intentions of the Court of London. What effect did this knowledge produce? Did it incline him to retract this declaration? Did it diſpoſe him even to ſoften it?

Effects produced by it on Lewis.

NOTHING like it. In this plain declaration, that the Court of London had not changed her ſentiments

on

on this important queſtion, Lewis diſcovers not the honeſt, artleſs effuſion of a ſteady, and conſiſtent government; but he diſcovers—an inſult offered to his good uncle, and to himſelf—a conviction that the Court of London had not been ſincere in her overtures for peace—a demonſtration of her hoſtile intentions. And having made all theſe wonderful diſcoveries; Lewis "commanded his agent at the Court of "London to obſerve thereafter a moſt profound "ſilence on the ſubject of peace;" "the hope "of which, nevertheleſs, ſtill flattered his heart;" "by the love of which he was ſtill animat-"ed;" and thereby induced graciouſly to permit his uncle, "if he ſaw fit, to carry on the media-"tion."

Terms propoſed by Lewis not ſtated;

So much for the preliminary of Lewis. As to what he calls *his* conditions of peace, both he and Charles leave us in the dark. We have, indeed, the word of Lewis, that they were very *moderate*. And who can doubt his word? He commenced mean while, and continued what even he allows to be acts of open hoſtility; but ſtill—and for that too we have his word—he cheriſhed the flattering hope of peace: and therefore yielded with readineſs to the exhortations of his uncle; to whom, without reſerve, he communicated the moderate conditions, upon which he was ready to lay down his arms. To the King of Spain, his uncle, his confederate, his ally, he communicated conditions which, to Europe at large, he has not thought it prudent to communicate. And good reaſon, no doubt, there was for this caution. Few Princes agree with the Houſe of Bourbon in their ideas of moderation. With equal candour did Charles communi-

cate

cate to Lewis, the propoſitions made by England. To Europe at large he has not condeſcended to make the ſame communication. And certainly there are conditions, of which it is much ſafer to give an arbitrary deſcription, than a candid communication. Paint them as "*exceptions*," as "*inadmiſſible*," and your buſineſs is done: provided always, that the reſt of Europe will be kind enough to rely, with implicit credulity, on the ſkill and fidelity of the artiſt. From that moment they furniſh "the completeſt evidence, "that an enemy was not inclined to peace."

but to be diſcovered from the temperament of the mediator,

BUT, without calling on the Royal Apologiſts for a preciſion to which they ſeem to have ſo unconquerable an averſion, we may form a competent judgment of the moderation of theſe conditions, by a review of—what is happily, in part at leaſt, revealed to us—the wiſe expedients propoſed by the mediator; the temperaments meant to ſoften the aſperity of the conditions offered by the belligerent powers, and to ſmooth the difficulties in the way of accommodation.

viz. a truce of many years.

FOR Charles, good Prince! was ſo affected at the approach of the calamities of war, ſo wedded to the fond hope of preventing them, that he even overlooked—what nothing but a microſcopic eye could have ſeen—every thing *offenſive* in the conduct of the Court of London [z]. And therefore, finding that the Court of London would not agree to the conditions, which Lewis ſo happily denominates "*his* conditions "of peace," the energetic and wiſe mediator "turned "all his attention" to the deviſing of other "means "of accompliſhing his pacific deſigns." What was

z Charles does not take this praiſe to himſelf. He enjoys it as the free gift of Lewis.

the

the reſult of this energy and wiſdom? Why, that "the belligerent powers ſhould *make a truce* of many "years [h]?"

THIS idea I conceive to have been borrowed from the Sublime Porte; who thinking herſelf forbidden by the Koran to make a perpetual peace with unbelievers, ſolves the difficulty by making a *truce* of many years. But, were it to be a peace or a truce, mutual conditions were to be required. What then were the conditions, which the energy and wiſdom of the mediator deviſed for the preſent truce? Or has Charles taken a ſtep farther back into the ancient policy of the Othmans? Does he conſider a truce as a mere ceſſation of hoſtilities, granted by one party at the humble requeſt of the other; and which the party granting may break at his pleaſure, without any previous notice? Certain it is, that both Charles and Lewis are perfectly ſilent about any conditions, which the mediator at firſt propoſed, as conditions of this truce.

Idea borrowed from the Turks.

LEWIS, indeed, adds, as "an eſſential condition of "the truce," that which he before had propoſed, as the eſſential preliminary of *his* peace, namely, that "the "United States ſhould be *included*; and that during "the truce they ſhould be treated as independent *de* "*facto*." And, leſt the inſolence of this condition ſhould not wound the dignity of the King ſo deeply as he meant, Lewis graciouſly adds—"He *conſented* "that the King might *treat with the Congreſs*, either "directly, or through the intervention of the King of "Spain."

Condition tacked to this truce by Lewis;

[h] Une treve à *longues années*.

and another added by Charles.

FINDING his nephew thus graciously disposed, Charles thought it a point of honour to add some mark of his congenial grace. And with this view, going to the very bottom of his benevolence, exhausting it, drawing out the very dregs of it, to this condition "of an "illimited truce, in which the United States were to "be treated as independent *de facto*," he took upon himself to add, with *respect to America*, "that every one "should continue in possession of what they should "respectively occupy at the moment of signing the "truce."

Insolence of these terms.

YOU have now before you, my countrymen, "all "the energetic steps" taken by this *powerful* mediator; "all the wise expedients," devised by this "sage ne-"gociator." You will judge "what effects they "*ought* to have produced." You will judge whether they were calculated to "bring the powers to an ac-"commodation *equally honourable to both parties*; to "smooth difficulties, and to prevent the calamities "of war." Or whether the proposal of such inadmissible, such insolent conditions, was not a little expedient, meanly adopted to gain the time, which was necessary to Spain for the completion of her armaments; and which might be usefully employed by the rebels, "in removing the difficulties of their former "situation;" "in giving stability to their new go-"vernments;" "in arming and disciplining their "people;" "in procuring more plentiful supplies of "all the means of resistance[1]." I call these conditions inadmissible and insolent. I trust to your discernment, and to your feelings, for your concurrence in the application of the terms. To justify it by

[1] See Franklyn's Memorial.

argument

argument would be to diſtruſt the one, and to inſult the other. Among the ſons of Britain, I truſt, "*no* "*one* would have concluded, that theſe conditions "could have been accepted." Had they not been refuſed; had they not been rejected, there is not a Briton, I truſt, but would have ſhrunk from the touch, and fired at the ſight of a Miniſtry, who would *then* have ſo foully tarniſhed the honour of the Crown; ſo baſely betrayed the intereſts, and ſo meanly humbled the dignity, of the people. Had the ſenſe of the nation been collected, we ſhould all, I truſt, have re-echoed the ſound, which yet vibrates in the ear of Charles; and told him, in the ſpirited language of Pitt—"Never till the Tower of London be taken "ſword in hand[k]."

Conſiſtency of Lewis.

To the praiſe of conſiſtency Lewis boldly aſſerts his claim. And, to do him juſtice, in a certain ſenſe, his title cannot be diſputed. Towards the cloſe of the negociation, he boaſts, "that he never degenerated "from the ſentiments, which he had always diſplayed." And if the diſplay of his ſentiments be taken from his actions, nothing can be more conſiſtent. Nay, we will allow him farther. From the moment he ſigned the treaty with the Americans, his language has been at uniſon with his ſentiments and his conduct. It was not always ſo. In the beginning of his reign, whilſt he was yet only ſecretly intriguing with the rebels, his language and his ſentiments did not ſo perfectly accord. Lewis, at that time, gave the moſt clear and ſolemn aſſurances, "that he would not by any means, directly or indi-

[k] See the Spaniſh Declaration of the laſt war.

" rectly, encourage the revolters:" he declared, " that " he conſidered himſelf to be bounden as well by the " common intereſts of every ſovereign power of Eu- " rope, as by the law of nations, and the faith of " treaties, to *diſcountenance* ſo unnatural, ſo unpro- " voked a revolt." Lewis knows, that I give the clear purport, if not the ſtrict tenor of his then declarations. He knows, that when the King remonſtrated, in firm, but friendly terms, on the indecency of ſuffering perſons to reſide in his capital, who pretended to be inveſted with a public character from the Congreſs; with what an appearance of warmth and ſenſibility he replied, " that he could never *ſo far forget* what he " owed to his own honour, to the faith of treaties, " and to the general intereſts of Europe, as to recog- " nize theſe men under the character to which they " were ſaid to pretend; or ſuffer them to reſide in his " dominions under any other character, than that of " private individuals." Hitherto the praiſe of conſiſtency was imperfect. His ſentiments were hoſtile; his conduct inſidious; but his words were friendly. But his conduct and his ſentiments have been throughout the ſame. There he has never degenerated. Whether declaring, as then, that the intereſt of Europe, the law of nations, the faith of treaties, and a ſenſe of honour, forbade him to aſſiſt, commanded him to diſcourage ſo unnatural a revolt; precluded him for ever from recognizing the claims, or receiving the agents, of the rebels: or declaring, as now, that nothing impoſed it on him as a duty to treat them as rebels; that his intereſt required him to acknowledge their claims; to allow them the rights of independent ſtates; and to

make them his dear and good allies; whom neither inclination nor duty permit him to forſake: whether ſecretly fomenting, or openly ſupporting, rebellion; whether deceiving our candor with falſe profeſſions, or affronting our underſtanding by ſophiſtical arguments; or inſulting our feelings by inadmiſſible conditions; his ſentiments and his conduct have been perfectly conſiſtent. There he has never degenerated from the moſt conſummate meanneſs and perfidy.

Causes of the enmity of Spain.

We have ſeen, my countrymen, the ſource of the enmity of Lewis. It aroſe from a conſciouſneſs that he had injured us. It may, therefore, well be expected to be bitter and implacable. But how had we offended Spain? What was there to call forth, what to juſtify, a declaration of war from her? Charles inſinuates one cauſe, and avows another. Lewis ſays, that the real cauſe was neither that which Charles has inſinuated, nor that which he has avowed; but a third, diſtinct from both. To which of the twain are we to give credit? For once, I believe, to Lewis. But let us hear what each of the royal apologiſts has to offer.

Cauſe inſinuated by Charles.

The cauſe which Charles inſinuates, as an apology for his declaration of war, is rather ſingular; namely, that the King of Great Britain did not, with all due ſubmiſſion, accede to the honourable terms of accommodation propoſed, and enforced, by this wiſe and energetic mediator. This is only inſinuated in the reſcript. But, having ſince reflected how diſgraceful it is, that ſo much wiſdom ſhould be unproductive, ſo much energy ineffectual, the King of Spain, in a later publication [1], has openly, and roundly, avowed

[1] Gazette of Madrid, July 2, copied into the Supplement of the Leyden Gazette, No LX. dated July 27.

this

this to be one, at leaſt, of the cauſes, which induced him to declare war againſt this devoted country. Nay he ſeems to be not a little angry, that greater ſtreſs had not been laid, greater attention paid to it here. Nay he goes ſo far as to declare, that he forewarned us, from the beginning, of his determination to be either a ſucceſsful mediator, or an implacable foe. In the true ſpirit of this declaration he ſays; "the negociation "having not only been *ineffectual*, but the Britiſh *Mi-* "*niſtry* having cut it ſhort by their laſt anſwer, con- "ceived in terms but ill ſuited to the dignity of the "*auguſt* mediator; how was it poſſible that this *Mi-* "*niſtry* could expect to preſerve the *friendſhip* of a "ſovereign, whom they had treated ſo indecently [m]?" Upon this reaſon, ſuppoſing the whole of it to be true, no comment is required; none indeed can be made. Inſtead of a comment let us ſubſtitute a parody; careful, as we ought, to put it into a language, as ſuitable as our poor abilities can furniſh, to the ideas formed of his own rank and dignity by the powerful *Mediator*, the *auguſt* Monarch. Suppoſe then we clothe it in the dignified ſtile of the Eaſt; and ſo leave it to work its own effect.

Clothed in the Eaſtern ſtyle.

"HEAR, oh England! Give ear, oh Britain! Where- "fore doſt thou war with my nephew, and lift up "thine arm againſt the ſon of my brother! Behold I "*the King*, powerful and auguſt, wiſe and energetic,

[m] My countrymen will here again obſerve, how naturally Charles ſlides into the ſtyle of the party-writer. It is the *Miniſtry* againſt whom he declares war; it is the *Miniſtry* whoſe *friend* he *was*, whoſe *enemy* he is now to commence. He talks too *of* the meſſage ſent by the King to his Parliament; not as of *his* meſſage, but as of ſomething put into his mouth by an *Redacteur*; juſt as thoſe who oppoſe an addreſs in anſwer to the *King*'s Speech, call it the ſpeech of the *Miniſter*.

"I will

"I will be the mediator between you. My juſtice, is "it not known? and mine impartiality, is not the "fame thereof gone forth? Therefore liſten unto me: "behold! I will *dictate* terms; and I will preſcribe "*laws* unto thee; and that ſhall be to *mediate*, as a "friend. Thou ſhalt bow down before my nephew; "and that ſhall be accounted *honourable* unto *both* par-"ties. Thou ſhalt unſay all that thou haſt ſaid; and "that ſhall be reckoned unto thee as *conformity*. Thou "ſhalt give up every thing; and ſo ſhalt thou *ſmooth* "*difficulties*. Thou ſhalt retain nothing; and ſo ſhalt "thou prevent the *calamities of war*. Hear, oh Eng-"land! and give ear, oh Britain! My moderation is "known unto all men. See that thou take my coun-"ſel in good part. Be not ſtiff-necked, nor ſtubborn; "neither be thou high-minded. Liſten unto me, leſt "my wrath be kindled; and mine armies go forth "with the armies of my nephew; even with the ar-"mies of the ſon of my brother; and I cut thee off "from the face of the earth. For my juſtice, is it "not known? and mine impartiality, is not the fame "thereof gone forth unto the ends of the earth?"

Cauſe avowed by Charles.

If, unaccuſtomed to the dignity of the eaſtern ſtyle, this kind of argument ſhould not convince you, Charles has other reaſons at hand. And they are reaſons of a very different ſort; they carry with them real weight—"inſults on the flag," "invaſions of the territories of "Spain."—When were they committed? By whom? where? how? Charles does not deſcend ſo low, as to ſpecify the trifling circumſtances of place, perſons, time, manner, or occaſion. Theſe may be required from little ſtates, but are infinitely beneath the dignity of

of the auguſt and puiſſant King of Spain [n]. But what you want in preciſion, ſhall for this time be made up, not in dignity, but in humour. For Charles, all at once, ſeized with a new vertigo, dreſſes in another maſk; quits the burniſhed crown of the monarch for the round wig of the attorney; whirls us to Weſtminſter-Hall; and very technically *declares* for divers torts and wrongs, that is to ſay *one hundred* [o], by him the King of England aforeſaid with force and arms done, to the great damage of him the King of Spain, aforeſaid; againſt the peace, and to the evil example of others. What anſwer ſhall we make to this avowed reaſon? The graveſt of all grave politicians could, I believe, find no other than the ſhrug of pity, or the ſmile of contempt.

Cauſe aſſigned by Lewis;

Lewis ſaw the diſtreſs of his uncle. He ſaw the volatility of the blood of Bourbon ſtagnate, fixed by

[n] The only attempts at a ſpecification are three. 1ſt, "That the Indian "nations have been excited againſt the inhabitants of Louiſiana." The fact is juſt the reverſe. The Governor of New Orleans ſecretly encouraged theſe very Indians, in excurſions againſt the Britiſh Weſtern Settlements. They were reclaimed, but not excited even to *retaliate* on the Spaniſh Settlements. The ſecond is, "That the ſovereignty of his Catholic Ma"jeſty has been invaded in the province of Darien." This complaint was made ſo lately, that no anſwer could yet have been received from Jamaica to the information demanded. But it is ridiculous enough, that this ſhould be urged as a juſtification of entering into a war in conjunction with a Prince, whoſe *profeſſed object* is to *invade his Britannic Majeſty's ſovereignty* over the vaſt continent of America; and that too by a *Mediator*, who does not bluſh to ſay, that the effects of the terms of the mediation propoſed by himſelf, would have been to ſecure ſucceſs to that invaſion. The third is, "That the Court of London has neglected to fulfil the Treaty of "Paris ſo far as relates to the Bay of Honduras." A diſcovery which, with all his energy and wiſdom, Charles never made from the year 1764, to the day of the date of the Reſcript.

[o] See the Reſcript, where the grievances are ſaid to amount to the round number of one hundred.

the dulneſs of the Spaniſh air. Not one colourable reaſon could the hebetated genius of Charles ſupply. Lewis ſteps forth, and, in the vivacity of his zeal, blunders out the true one. "After ſo cutting a declaration [p]," ſays he, "the continuation of war became "inevitable. And from that moment it became his "Majeſty to *invite* the King of Spain to act in con-"junction with him, CONFORMABLY TO "THEIR ENGAGEMENTS."

Now, then, the ſecret is out. Charles had no inducement of his own to declare war againſt England; but he was invited by France. He declares war, not becauſe inſults had been offered to his flag, or invaſions made upon his territories, but becauſe his engagements with France compel him to ſupport her in every attempt, her ambition may make upon the rights of her neighbours, the peace of nations, and the liberties of Europe. The union of the forces of Bourbon is then the effect of the Family Compact. And the Family Compact, what is it? The preamble honeſtly avows, that its object is, "to eſtabliſh the reciprocal intereſts, "and to perpetuate the mutual proſperity of the houſe "of Bourbon" againſt all the world beſides. As honeſtly do the articles of ſtipulation avow, that the different branches of the Houſe of Bourbon have conſpired effectually to annul the renunciations contained in the Treaty of Utrecht; renunciations which coſt to Europe at large, and to this country in particular, mines of its pureſt gold, and rivers of its nobleſt blood. "*The con-*"*tracting parties ſtipulate to act as if the two monarchies*

that is, the Family Compact.

[p] Namely, that England would not treat, till France retracted her Declaration acknowledging the rebels as Independent States.

"*formed only one and the ſame power* [9]." What then is this family compact? It is not leſs deteſtable, but it is infinitely more baneful, than an aſſociation of robbers. Their inroads are confined to the poſſeſſions, their attacks to the lives, of a few individuals: but the family compact ſtrikes at the poſſeſſions and the lives of nations. It is an aſſociation againſt the peace, the liberties, the happineſs of Europe.

Concluſion. FRIENDS, and Fellow Countrymen! I have ſet before you the foes with whom you are to contend in the trueſt point of view. The portraits are their own. Not a line have I added, or diminiſhed. It was uſeleſs. It would have been hurtful. Not the bold hand of a Demoſthenes, not the labouring pencil of a Cicero, could have added one ſtroke to the hideouſneſs of the features; one ſhade to the horror of the gloom that ſurrounds them.

BUT they are not holden up to you merely as objects of horror or reſentment. The ſight muſt fire your indignation; but let it alſo animate your hope. Attacked by enemies like theſe, you may look up with a well-grounded confidence to heaven for protection. The calamities of war cannot be imputed to you; the blood that will be ſhed will not be upon you, or your children. On your, part the war was neceſſary; and therefore juſt. Your enemies left you no alternative. It is a war of

[9] The treaty allows the King of Naples and Duke of Parma to accede to it; *all* are to form only *one* and the *ſame Power*.

defence,

defence. You did not begin it. Lewis began it. He began it as ſoon as he aſcended the throne, he is diſgracing. I know, indeed, that he long continued to ſpeak peace. Whilſt concealing his inſidious engagements, he was only ſecretly encouraging the rebels, intriguing with their agents, ſupplying them with men, arms, ammunition, he ſaid he was at peace with you. When, to prevent their return to their allegiance by flattering their pride, he publiſhed his inſidious engagements, even then he ſaid he was at peace with you—"But heavens! is there a man of a right mind among "you, who would judge of peace or war by words, "and not by actions! He whoſe deſigns, whoſe whole "conduct, tends to reduce me, that man is at war "with me, though not a blow hath been given, not "one weapon drawn[r]." From the day that Lewis ſent a man, a gun, a ſword, a grain of powder, to America, from that day he began hoſtilities. And now, for what are you fighting? For your own. For the recovery of thoſe rights, to acquire which your fathers and yourſelves have bled; to ſecure which, you are ſupporting, and your children's children muſt yet ſupport, a heavy load of debt. Let theſe reflections give keenneſs to the edge, and force to the ſtroke, of your ſword.

You have every claim to the aſſiſtance of nations: every right which a remembrance of paſt ſervices, or a ſenſe of preſent intereſt, can give. Look round upon the States of Europe. Where is the people, whoſe battles you, or your anceſtors, have not fought; whoſe rights you have not protected; or whoſe exiſtence you

[r] See Demoſthenes, Philippic III.

have not ſecured againſt the ambition of the Houſe of Bourbon? If they turn to the annals of their reſpective countries, they will ſcarcely find a page, which does not mark, in bloody characters, the treachery of the Houſe of Bourbon. If they reflect a moment on the preſent conduct of the ſame ambitious houſe, they will feel that the cauſe of Britain is now the common cauſe of Europe. If ſucceſs ſhould crown the perfidious attempts of the Houſe of Bourbon in Britiſh America, the ſame arts will be employed, and with the ſame ſucceſs, to wreſt their diſtant dependencies from every State of Europe. Nay the ſame arts will be employed, and with the ſame ſucceſs, to create diſaffection, and jealouſies, and diviſions in their domeſtic governments. She has actually began to employ them in Europe; endeavouring, by the grant of inſidious diſtinctions, to influence the votes of the United States, and to ſet one province againſt another.

But let us ſuppoſe the worſt. Say that national gratitude ſhould be chilled, or the arm of alliance contracted, by the cold ſpirit of a narrow policy; ſtill you have reſources within yourſelves. Uſe them manfully; and, though alone, you are equal to the conteſt. I need not remind you of the gallant deeds of your anceſtors. I need not carry you to the plains of Agincourt, or the fields of Creſſi. I need not recal to you the victories of a Marlborough. In your own times, beneath your own hands, how has the haughty Houſe of Bourbon ſhrunk, crouched, abaſhed and diſcomfited. "As to naval power, troops, revenues, all kinds of "preparation, every thing that is eſteemed the ſtrength "of a ſtate, are you not as well, are you not as am-

"ply,

"ply, provided as formerly [a]!" If you are not wanting to yourſelves, then, will they not have the ſame force, the ſame efficacy?

THESE indeed are not the only points that require your attention. If you mean to be ſerved with fidelity, you muſt ſupport the men who ſerve you faithfully. You can do it. You did it in the laſt war. Succeſs and victories were your rewards. Feel your own conſequence. Here the opinion of the people cannot with ſafety be deſpiſed: the voice of the people commands attention. As individuals, perhaps, you are not competent to judge of the propriety of every particular ſtep, every particular order. But you are very competent to judge of a general line of conduct. You can judge, whether thoſe, whoſe department it is to form the plans of operation, and to provide the means of defence and annoyance, are active, induſtrious, provident. If the orders they give be intelligent; if the means they provide be adequate—adequate, I mean, not in the eyes of a nice calculator, a ſcrupulous arithmetician, but in the eyes of a Vernon, or a Hawke—then it is at once your duty and your intereſt to ſupport them. You can judge whether thoſe who are to execute theſe plans, follow the ſpirit of their orders; exert with energy, direct with wiſdom, the forces with which they are entruſted. If they do, it is at once your duty and your intereſt to ſupport them. But all is loſt, if your counſels be diſtracted by diſſentions; your preparations retarded by indeciſion; all is loſt, if the men who command your fleets and your armies, to gratify views of intereſt, or of faction, may ſuffer thoſe fleets to lan-

[a] Demoſthenes, Philippic III.

guiſh,

guiſh, and thoſe armies to moulder away, inactive and inglorious. "Your ſafety, your very vitals, are affected, when ſuch men excite envy, if their deſtructive ſchemes ſucceed; laughter if they confeſs it; pardon if they be convicted; reſentment at their being accuſed [t]." All is loſt, "if reaſon and penetration do not inſpire you with an abhorrence of thoſe who defend the meaſures, and plead the cauſe, of the enemy before you [u]." All is loſt, "if you ceaſe for a moment to bear in mind the abſolute impoſſibility of conquering your foreign enemy, until you have ſilenced thoſe, who are ſerving him within your walls [x]."

[t] Demoſthenes, Philippic III. [u] Ibid. [x] Ibid.

APPEN-

APPENDIX:

CONTAINING

The RESCRIPT of the Court of SPAIN,

AND

The MANIFESTO of the Court of VERSAILLES.

APPENDIX:

CONTAINING

The Rescript of the Count of Brain,

AND

The Manifesto of the Count of Versailles.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

COPY *of a Note delivered to the Lord Viſcount* Weymouth *by the Marquis* d'Almodavar, *the* 16*th of* June 1779.

TOUT le monde a été temoin de la noble impartialité du Roi au milieu des demêlés de la cour de Londres avec ſes Colonies Americaines, et avec la France. Outre cela, S. M. ayant appris qu'on deſiroit ſa puiſſante mediation, en fit genereuſement l'offre, qui fut acceptée par les Puiſſances belligerantes; et pour ce ſeul motif un batiment de guerre fut expedié de la part de S. M. B. à un des ports d'Eſpagne. Le Roi a fait des demarches les plus energiques, et celles qui devoient produire le plus d'effet, pour amener ces Puiſſances à un accommodement également honorable pour les deux parties, propoſant à cette fin de

TRANSLATION *of a Note delivered to the Lord Viſcount* Weymouth *by the Marquis* d'Almodavar, *the* 16*th of* June 1779.

ALL the world has been witneſs to the noble impartiality of the King during the diſputes of the court of London with its American Colonies, and with France. Beſide this, his Majeſty having learned that his powerful mediation was deſired, generouſly made an offer of it, which was accepted by the belligerent Powers; and for this motive only a ſhip of war was ſent, on the part of his Britannic Majeſty, to one of the ports of Spain. The King has taken the moſt energetic ſteps, and ſuch as ought to have produced the moſt effect, to bring theſe Powers to an accommodation equally honourable to both

ſages temperaments propres à applanir les difficultés, et à prevenir les calamités de la guerre. Mais quoique les propoſitions de S. M. et particulierement celles de ſon *ultimatum* aient été conformes à celles qu'en d'autres tems la cour de Londres elle-même avoit paru juger convenables pour un accommodement, et qu'elles aient été tout auſſi moderées, elles viennent d'etre rejettées d'une maniere qui prouve bien le peu de deſir qu'a le Cabinet Britannique de rendre la paix à l'Europe, et de conſerver l'amitié du Roi. En effet la conduite de ce cabinet à l'egard de S. M. pendant tout le cours de la negotiation a eu pour but de la prolonger durant plus de huit mois, ſoit par de vains pretextes, ſoit par des reponſes on ne ſauroient * moins concluantes; tandis que dans cette intervalle on continuoit à pouſſer à un exces incroyable les inſultes contre le pavillon Eſpagnol, et la violation des territoires du Roi. On a fait des priſes; on a viſité et pillé des batimens; on a fait feu ſur un grand nombre, qui ont été forcés de ſe defendre; on a ouvert et mis en pieces les regiſtres et les pacquets de la cour même, trouvés a bord des pacquebots courièrs de S. M. On a menacé les domaines de ſa couronne en Amerique; et on s'y eſt porté juſqu'à l'extremité horrible de ſoulever les

parties; propoſing, for this end, wiſe expedients for ſmoothing all difficulties, and preventing the calamities of war. But although his Majeſty's propoſitions, and particularly thoſe of his *ultimatum*, were conformable to thoſe, which, at other times, the court of London itſelf had appeared to judge proper for an accommodation, and were alſo quite as moderate, they have been rejected in a manner that fully proves the little deſire which the Britiſh Cabinet has to reſtore peace to Europe, and to preſerve the King's friendſhip. In effect, the conduct of that Cabinet with regard to his Majeſty, during the whole courſe of the negociation, has had for its object to prolong it for more than eight months, either by vain pretences, or by anſwers which could not be more inconcluſive; whilſt in this interval, the inſults on the Spaniſh flag, and the violation of the King's territories, were carried on to an incredible exceſs. Prizes have been made; ſhips have been ſearched and plundered; a great number of them have been fired upon, which have been obliged to defend themſelves; the regiſters have been opened and torn in pieces; and even the packets of the court, found on boad the King's packet-boats. The dominions of the crown in America have been threat-

* So in the copy publiſhed by authority.

nations Indiennes appellées Chatcas, Cheraquies, et Chicachas, contre les innocents habitans de la Louiſiane, qui auroient été les victimes de la fureur de ces barbares, ſi les Chatcas eux-mêmes ne ſe fuſſent repentis, et n'euſſent revelé tout ce qu'avoit tramé la ſeduction des Anglois. On a uſurpé la ſouveraineté de S. M. dans la province de Darien, et ſur la côte de St. Blas; le Gouverneur de la Jamaique ayant accordé à un Indian rebelle la patente de Capitaine-general de ces provinces; enfin, on a recemment violé le territoire de la Baye d'Honduras, en y exerçant des actes d'hoſtilité, et autres excès contre des Eſpagnols qu'on a empriſonnés, et dont on a envahi les maiſons; outre que la Cour de Londres avoit juſqu'ici negligé d'accomplir ce que ſtipule relativement à cette côte l'article 16 du dernier traité de Paris.

Des griefs auſſi nombreux, auſſi graves, et auſſi recents, ont été, à diverſes repriſes, l'objet des plaintes portées au nom du Roi, et detaillées dans des mémoires qu'on a remis aux miniſtres Britanniques à Londres, ou qu'on leur a addreſſés par la voie de l'ambaſſadeur d'Angleterre à Madrid: mais quoique les reponſes qu'on a reçues aient été amicales, juſqu'à preſent S. M. n'a obtenu d'autres

ened; and they have gone to the dreadful extremity of raiſing the Indian nations called the Chatcas, Cheroquies, and Chicachas, againſt the innocent inhabitants of Louiſiana; who would have been the victims of the rage of theſe barbarians, if the Chatcas themſelves had not repented, and revealed all that the ſeduction of the Engliſh had planned. The ſovereignty of his Majeſty in the province of Darien, and on the coaſt of St. Blas, has been uſurped, the Governor of Jamaica having granted to a rebel Indian the commiſſion of Captain-general of thoſe provinces: in ſhort, the territory of the Bay of Honduras has been recently violated, by exerciſing acts of hoſtility and other exceſſes againſt the Spaniards; who have been impriſoned, and whoſe houſes have been invaded: beſides which, the court of London has hitherto neglected to accompliſh what the 16th article of the laſt treaty of Paris ſtipulated relative to that coaſt.

Grievances ſo numerous, ſo weighty, and recent, have been at different times the object of complaints made in the King's name, and ſtated in memorials, which were either delivered to the Britiſh miniſters at London, or tranſmitted to them through the channel of the Engliſh Ambaſſador at Madrid; but although the anſwers which were received have been friendly, his Majeſty has hitherto obtained

ſatisfaction, que de voir réiterer les inſultes, qui depuis ces derniers tems, ſont deja portées au nombre de cent.

Le Roi procedant avec la ſincerité et la franchiſe qui le characteriſent, a declaré formellement à la Cour de Londres, dès le commencement de ſes démélés avec la France, que la conduite de l'Angleterre ſeroit la regle de celle que l'Eſpagne auroit à tenir.

S. M. declara également à cette Cour, qu'en même tems que ſes differends avec celle de Paris s'accommoderoient, il ſeroit abſoluement neceſſaire de regler ceux qui ſe ſeroit élevés, ou qui pourroient encore s'élever, avec l'Eſpagne; et dans le plan de mediation qui fut envoyé à l'Ambaſſadeur ſouſſigné, le 28 Septembre dernier, et qu'il remit au miniſtre Britannique vers le commencement d'Octobre (plan dont fut auſſi inſtruit le Lord Grantham à qui on en donna copie) S. M. annonça, en termes poſitifs, aux Puiſſances belligerantes, que, conſiderant les inſultes qu' eprouvoient ſes ſujets et ſes domaines, ainſi que les atteintes portées à ſes droits, elle ſe verroit dans la neceſſité de prendre ſon parti au cas où la negociation, au lieu de ſe ſuivre avec ſincerité, ſe romproit, ou ne produiroit aucun effet.

Les griefs donnés par la Cour de Londres n'ayant point ceſſé,

no other ſatisfaction than to ſee the inſults repeated, which lately have amounted to the number of one hundred.

The King, proceeding with the ſincerity and candor which characteriſe him, has formally declared to the Court of London, from the commencement of its diſputes with France, that the conduct of England ſhould be the rule of that which Spain would hold.

His Majeſty likewiſe declared to that Court, that at the ſame time that her differences with that of Paris ſhould be accommodated, it would be abſolutely neceſſary to regulate thoſe, which had ariſen, or might ſtill ariſe, with Spain; and in the plan of mediation which was ſent to the underwritten Ambaſſador the 28th of laſt September, and which was by him delivered to the Britiſh miniſtry in the beginning of October (a plan of which Lord Grantham was apprized, and of which he received a copy), his Majeſty declared, in poſitive terms, to the belligerent Powers, that conſidering the inſults which his ſubjects and dominions had ſuffered, and likewiſe the attacks levelled at his rights, he ſhould be under the neceſſity of taking a decided courſe, in caſe the negociation, inſtead of being continued with ſincerity, ſhould either be broken off, or produce no effect.

The cauſes of complaint given by the Court of London

et cette Court ne laiſſant appercevoir aucune diſpoſition à les reparer, le Roy a reſolu et ordonné à ſon Ambaſſadeur de declarer, Que l'honneur de ſa couronne, la protection qu'il doit à ſes ſujets, et ſa dignité perſonelle, ne lui permettent plus de laiſſer continuer ſes inſultes, et de negliger plus long tems la reparation de celles qui ont deja été reçues; et que, dans cette vue, malgré les diſpoſitions de S. M. et même le penchant particulier qu'elle a toujours eu, et temoigné, à cultiver l'amitié de S. M. B. elle ſe voit dans la facheuſe neceſſité d'employer tous les moyens que lui a confiés le Tout Puiſſant pour ſe faire rendre la juſtice, qu'elle a ſollicité par tant de voies ſans pouvoir l'obtenir. Se repoſant ſur l'equité de ſa cauſe, S. M. eſpere que les ſuites de cette reſolution ne lui ſeront imputées, ni devant Dieu, ni devant les hommes; et que les nations ſe formeront de cette reſolution une idèe convenable, en la comparant à la conduite qu'elles memes ont eprouvées de la part du Miniſtere Britannique. Londres, ce 16 Juin, 1779.

Le Marquis d'ALMODAVAR.

not having ceaſed, and that Court ſhewing no diſpoſition to make reparation for them, the King has reſolved and orders his Ambaſſador to declare, That the honour of his crown, the protection which he owes to his ſubjects, and his own perſonal dignity, do not permit him to ſuffer the continuance of her inſults; and to neglect any longer the reparation of thoſe already received; and that in this view, notwithſtanding the pacific diſpoſitions of his Majeſty, and even the particular inclination he has always had, and expreſſed, for cultivating the friendſhip of his Britannic Majeſty, he finds himſelf under the diſagreeable neceſſity of making uſe of all the means, with which the Almighty has entruſted him, to obtain that juſtice which he has ſolicited by ſo many ways, without being able to acquire it. Confiding in the juſtice of his cauſe, his Majeſty hopes that the conſequences of this reſolution will not be imputed to him, neither before God nor man; and that other nations will form a ſuitable idea of this reſolution, by comparing it with the conduct which they themſelves have experienced on the part of the Britiſh Miniſtry. London, 16 June, 1779.

(Signed)
Le Marquis d'ALMODAVAR.

N. B. This bald tranſlation is taken from the copy printed by authority. Only ſome few and ſlight alterations have been made to render it intelligible to an Engliſh reader.

APPENDIX.

No. II.

France.—Louis XVI.

COPY *of the* French *Manifeſto; containing a Recital of the Motives of the* French *King's Conduct with reſpect to* England.

LORSQUE la Providence appella le Roi au trône, la France jouiſſoit de la paix la plus profonde. Le premier ſoin de ſa Majeſté fut de manifeſter à toutes les puiſſances ſon deſir d'en perpetuer la durée: Toutes applaudirent à des diſpoſitions auſſi heureuſes: Le Roi d'Angleterre en particulier en témoigna ſa ſatisfaction, et donna à S. M. les aſſurances les plus expreſſives d'une ſincere amitié.

Cette réciprocité de ſentimens autoriſoit le Roi à croire, que la cour de Londres étoit enfin diſpoſée à ſuivre un marche plus juſte, et plus amicale, que celle qu'elle avoit tenüe depuis la paix conclue en 1763; et qu'elle mettroit une terme aux procédés arbitraires que les ſujets du Roi avoient éprouvés

TRANSLATION *of the* French *Manifeſto; containing a Recital of the Motives of the* French *King's Conduct with reſpect to* England.

WHEN it pleaſed Providence to call his Majeſty to the throne, France was in the enjoyment of the moſt profound peace. The firſt care of his Majeſty was to announce to all the other powers his deſire of perpetuating the duration of it. Diſpoſitions ſo happy were applauded by all. The King of England in particular teſtified his ſatisfaction at them; and gave his Majeſty the moſt expreſs aſſurances of a ſincere friendſhip.

This reciprocality of ſentiments juſtified the King in believing, that the court of London was, at length, diſpoſed to purſue a line of conduct more juſt and more friendly than that which ſhe had purſued ſince the peace concluded in 1763; and that ſhe would put an end to the arbitrary proceedings,

de ſa part, depuis cette epoque, dans les quatre parties du monde. Sa Majeſté ſe perſuadoit qu'elle pouvoit d'autant plus compter ſur la verité des proteſtations du Roi d'Angleterre, que le germe de la révolution, que l'Amerique vient d'éprouver, commençoit à ſe developper de la maniere la plus alarmante pour la Grande Brétagne.

Mais la cour de Londres, prenant pour crainte ou pour foibleſſe ce qui n'etoit que l'effet des diſpoſitions pacifiques du Roi, demeura fidéle à ſon ancien ſyſtème; elle continua ſes vexations, et ſes actes de violence contre le commerce et la navigation des ſujets de ſa Majeſté.

Le Roi, jugeant le Roi d'Angleterre d'apres ſes propres ſentimens, lui défera avec la plus grande franchiſe tous ſes griefs; et il attendoit avec confiance le redreſſement: Il y a plus; ſa Majeſté inſtruite des embarras que cauſoient à la cour de Londres les affaires de l'Amerique Septentrionale, évita de les augmenter, en inſiſtant trop vivement ſur des reparations, que le miniſtère Anglois ne ceſſoit de promettre et d'éluder.

Telle étoit la poſition des deux cours, lorſque les procédés de celle de Londres forcérent ſes anciennes Colonies

which the ſubjects of the King had experienced, on her part, ever ſince that period, in all quarters of the world. And the King was perſuaded, that he might have the greater reliance on the truth of the proteſtations of the King of England, as the ſeeds of the revolution, lately effected in America, began to unfold themſelves in a manner the moſt alarming to Great Britain.

But the court of London, taking for fear or for weakneſs what was only the effect of the pacific diſpoſition of the King, remained firm in her ancient ſyſtem; continued her vexations, and her acts of violence, againſt the commerce and the navigation of his Majeſty's ſubjects.

The King, judging the King of England by his own feelings, laid before him, with the greateſt openneſs, all his grievances; relied on him, with confidence, for redreſs. Nay more, the King, informed of the perplexities in which the affairs of North America had involved the court of London, avoided increaſing them, by inſiſting too warmly on thoſe acts of reparation, which the Engliſh miniſtry was continually promiſing and eluding.

Such was the ſituation of the two courts, when the proceedings of that of London compelled her late Colonies to

de recourir à la voye des armes, pour maintenir leurs droits, leurs priviléges, et leur liberté. Tout le monde connoit l'epoque ou cet évenement éclata; les démarches multipliées et infructueuſes des Americains, pour rentrer dans le ſein de leur Mère Patrie; la maniere dont l'Angleterre les répouſſa; enfin l'acte de l'independance, qui en fut, et qui dut en être, le reſultat.

L'état de guerre, où les Etats Unis de l'Amerique Septentrionale ſe trouvérent néceſſairement à l'egard de l'Angleterre, les força de ſe frayer un chemin pour arriver juſqu'aux autres puiſſances de l'Europe, et pour ouvrir un commerce direct avec elles: le Roi auroit trahi les intérêts les plus eſſentiels de ſon royaume, s'il eut refuſé de les admettre dans ſes ports, et de les faire participer aux avantages dont jouiſſent toutes les autres nations.

Cette conduite juſte, ſage, et ſuivie par la plûpart des autres Etats commerçans de l'Europe, engagea la cour de Londres à ſe permettre les plaintes et les repreſentations les plus amères: elle s'étoit perſuadée ſans doute qu'il lui ſuffiroit d'employer le langage de ſon ambition et de ſa hauteur, pour obtenir de la France des preuves d'une déférence ſans bornes.

have recourſe to arms, in defence of their rights, their privileges, and their liberty. All the world knows the æra when this event burſt forth; the repeated, but fruitleſs, attempts of the Americans to return to the boſom of their Mother Country; the manner in which England rejected them; and laſtly, the act of independence which was, and could not but be, the natural reſult.

The ſtate of war, in which the United States of North America neceſſarily found themſelves engaged with England, compelled them to clear to themſelves a road, which might lead them immediately to the other powers of Europe, and open a direct commerce with them. The King would have been wanting to the moſt eſſential intereſts of his kingdom, had he refuſed to receive them into his ports, and admit them to a participation of the advantages enjoyed by all other nations.

This conduct, juſt, prudent, and followed by moſt of the other commercial ſtates of Europe, induced the court of London to indulge herſelf in complaints and remonſtrances the moſt ſevere. She was perſuaded, no doubt, that ſhe had only to employ the language of her ambition, and her pride, to obtain marks of unlimited deference from France.

Mais aux propos et aux démarches les moins meſurés, le Roi n'oppoſa conſtamment que le calme de la juſtice et de la raiſon: ſa Majeſté fit connoître, ſans détour, au Roi d'Angleterre, " qu'elle n'étoit ni ne " prétendoit etre le juge de " ſa querelle avec ſes anci- " ennes Colonies, et que ce " n'étoit point à elle à la ven- " ger; que par conſéquent " rien ne lui impoſoit l'obli- " gation de traiter les Ameri- " cains comme des rebelles; " de leur fermer les ports de " ſon royaume, et encore moins " d'interdire à ſes ſujets tout " commerce et toute eſpéce de " liaiſon avec eux."

Cependant le Roi voulut bien mettre les entraves, qui pouvoient dépendre de lui, à l'exportation des armes et des munitions de guerre; et il donna même l'aſſurance la plus poſitive, que non-ſeulement il ne protégeroit point ce commerce, mais auſſi qu'il laiſſeroit à l'Angleterre une entière liberte de réprimer, ſelon les règles preſcrites par les traités, et ſelon les loix et uſages de la mer, tous ceux de ſes ſujets, qui ſeroient trouvés en contravention à ſes défenſes. Le Roi alla plus loin encore: il ſe fit un devoir ſcrupuleux d'executer les ſtipulations du traité de commerce ſigné à Utrecht, quoique l'Angleterre eût refuſé, dans le tems, de le ratifier dans toutes ſes parties; et que la cour

But to language and proceedings the moſt unguarded, the King conſtantly oppoſed the calm of juſtice and of reaſon. His Majeſty, in direct terms, informed the King of England, " That he was " not, neither did he pretend " to be, judge of his quar- " rel with his late Colonies; " that it was not his part to " avenge it; that, in conſe- " quence, nothing impoſed it " on him as a duty to treat the " Americans as rebels, to ſhut " his ports againſt them; ſtill " leſs to prohibit his ſubjects " from all commerce and all " connection with them."

Nevertheleſs the King conſented to clog, as far as it depended upon him, the exportation of arms and warlike ſtores. Nay, he gave the moſt poſitive aſſurance, not only that he would not protect this traffic, but alſo that he would leave England at full liberty to repreſs, in a manner conformable to the rules laid down in treaties, and to the laws and uſages of the ſea, all ſuch of his ſubjects as ſhould be found acting in contravention to his prohibitions. The King went yet farther: He impoſed upon himſelf as a duty the moſt ſcrupulous adherence to the ſtipulations contained in the treaty of commerce ſigned at Utrecht, though England, at the time, had refuſed to ratify ſome parts

de Londres y contrevînt journellement. Sa Majeſté défendit en conſéquence aux corſaires Americains d'armer dans ſes ports, d'y vendre leurs priſes, et d'y séjourner au delà du tems porte par le traité, qui vient d'être cité: elle défendit même à ſes ſujets de faire l'achat de ces priſes, et les menaça de confiſcation dans le cas où ils tranſgreſſeroient ſes ordres; ce qui a eu ſon effet.

Mais tous ces actes d'une complaiſance auſſi marquée, tant de fidelité à remplir un traité que l'on auroit été autoriſé à regarder comme non exiſtant, etoient bien loin de ſatisfaire la cour de Londres: elle prétendoit rendre le Roi reſponſable de toutes les tranſgreſſions; tandis que le Roi d'Angleterre ne pouvoit pas lui même, malgré un acte formel du parlement, empêcher ſes propres negocians de fournir des marchandiſes, et même des munitions de guerre aux Colonies.

Il eſt aiſé de comprendre, combien le refus de ſe prêter aux prétenſions arbitraires de l'Angleterre dut bleſſer l'amour propre de cette puiſſance, et reveiller ſon ancienne animoſité contre la France. Elle s'irrita d'autant plus qu'elle commençoit à eprouver des revers en Amerique; que tout lui prognoſtiquoit la ſeparation irrevocable de ſes anciens Co-

of it; and though the court of London every day infringed it. In purſuance of this treaty the King prohibited the American privateers from arming in his ports, from ſelling their prizes there, or from ſtaying there beyond the time limited in the ſaid treaty. He even forbade his ſubjects to purchaſe theſe prizes; and threatened them with confiſcation in all caſes where they ſhould tranſgreſs his orders. This had its effect.

But all theſe acts of a condeſcenſion ſo remarkable, this exactitude in fulfilling a treaty, which one would have been juſtified in regarding as annihilated, were far from ſatisfying the court of London. That court pretended to render the King reſponſible for every tranſgreſſion of his orders, whilſt the King of England could not himſelf, notwithſtanding a formal act of parliament, prevent his own merchants from furniſhing goods, and even warlike ſtores to the Colonies.

It may eaſily be conceived how much the refuſal to fall in with the arbitrary pretenſions of England would neceſſarily wound the pride of that power, and awaken her ancient animoſity againſt France. She was the more exaſperated, becauſe ſhe was beginning to feel unfavourable turns in America; becauſe every thing was foreboding the irrevocable ſe-

lons, et les pertes qui devoient en être la ſuite inévitable; et qu'elle voyoit la France profiter d'une partie d'un commerce qu'elle avoit repouſſé d'une main indiſcrète, et s'occuper des moyens de faire reſpecter ſon pavillon.

Ce ſont toutes ces cauſes réunies, qui augmentèrent le deſeſpoir de la Cour de Londres; et qui la portèrent à couvrir les mers d'armateurs munis de lettres de marque d'une teneur vraiment offenſive; à violer ſans menagement la foi des traités; à troubler, ſous les prétextes les plus frivoles et les plus abſurdes, le commerce et la navigation des ſujets du Roi; à s'arroger un empire tyrannique en pleine mer; à préſcrire des loix arbitraires, inconnuës et inadmiſſibles; à inſulter, en plus d'une occaſion, le pavillon de ſa Majeſté; enfin à violer ſon territoire, tant en Europe qu'en Amerique, de la manière la plus characteriſée et la plus inſultante.

Si le Roi eût moins reſpecté les droits de l'humanité; s'il eût été moins avare du ſang de ſes ſujets; enfin ſi, au lieu de ſuivre l'impulſion de ſon propre caractère, il n'eût pris conſeil que de ſa dignité bleſſée, il n'auroit point heſité un inſtant à uſer de repréſailles, et à repouſſer l'inſulte par la force de ſes armes.

paration of her late Coloniſts; and the loſſes which could not but be the inevitable conſequences of that ſeparation; and becauſe ſhe ſaw that France was at once availing herſelf of a part of that commerce, which with the hand of indiſcretion ſhe had rejected; and moreover intent upon the means of inſuring reſpect to her flag.

It was the union of all theſe cauſes, which rendered the Court of London deſperate; which urged her to cover the ſeas with her privateers, furniſhed with letters of marque in a ſtyle really offenſive; to violate without ſcruple the faith of treaties; to diſturb, under the moſt frivolous and abſurd pretences, the commerce and navigation of the ſubjects of the King; to arrogate a tyrannical dominion on the high ſeas; to preſcribe laws arbitrary, unknown, inadmiſſible; to inſult, on many occaſions, his Majeſty's flag; and laſtly, to violate his territories, as well in Europe as in America, in a manner the moſt pointed and inſulting.

Had the King paid leſs reſpect to the rights of humanity; had he been leſs ſparing of the blood of his ſubjects; in ſhort, inſtead of following the impulſe of his own private character, had he liſtened only to the dictates of his inſulted dignity, he muſt, without a moment's heſitation, have retaliated, and repelled inſult by arms;

Mais S. M. fit taire ſon juſte reſſentiment. Elle voulut combler la méſure des bons procedés, parcequ'elle avoit encore aſſez d'opinion de ſes ennemis, pour ſe flatter, qu'à force de modération et de repréſentations amicales, elle reuſſiroit enfin à les ramener dans la voye de la conciliation, que leur propre interêt leur conſeilloit.

C'eſt par une ſuite de ces conſiderations que le Roi déféra à la Cour de Londres tous ſes griefs. Sa Majeſté les fit accompagner de repréſentations les plus ſerieuſes; parcequ' elle ne vouloit point laiſſer le Roi d'Angleterre dans l'incertitude ſur la diſpoſition ferme, où elle etoit de maintenir ſa dignité, de protéger les droits et les interêts de ſes ſujets, et de faire reſpecter ſon pavillon.

Mais la Cour de Londres affecta de garder un ſilence offenſant ſur la plûpart des offices de l'ambaſſadeur du Roi; et lorſqu'elle ſe détermina à repondre, il ne lui en couta rien de nier les faits les mieux prouvés; d'avancer des principes contraires au droit des gens, aux traités, et aux loix de la mer, et d'encourager des jugemens et des confiſcations de l'injuſtice la plus révoltante, en excluant j'uſqu' aux moyens d'appel.

Tandis que la Cour de Londres mettoit à une ſi forte e-

But the King ſilenced his juſt reſentment. He determined to fill up the meaſure of his equity, becauſe he yet entertained ſuch an opinion of his enemies, as to flatter himſelf, that, by moderation and friendly remonſtrances, he ſhould in the end ſucceed in bringing them back to the means of conciliation, which their own intereſts adviſed them to adopt.

It was in purſuance of theſe conſiderations, that his Majeſty laid before the Court of London all his grievances. He accompanied them by the moſt ſerious remonſtrances. For he was determined not to leave the King of England in any doubt about the firm reſolution which he had taken to protect the rights and intereſts of his ſubjects, and to enſure reſpect to his flag.

But the Court of London affected the moſt offenſive ſilence as to the greater part of the friendly repreſentations of the ambaſſador; and when ſhe determined to give any anſwer, ſhe made no ſcruple of denying the beſt authenticated facts; of advancing principles contrary to the right of nations, to treaties, and to the marine laws; and of encouraging judgments and confiſcations, revoltingly unjuſt, excluding even the means of appeal.

Whilſt the Court of London was putting the patience

preuvé la modération et la magnanimité du Roi, elle faiſoit dans ſes ports des préparatifs, et des armemens, qui ne pouvoient avoir l'Amerique pour objet. Leur but étoit, par conſequent, trop déterminé, pour que le Roi pût s'y méprendre; et dès-lors il devint d'un devoir rigoreux pour ſa Majeſté de faire des diſpoſitions capables de prévenir les mauvais deſſeins de ſon ennemi, et des déprédations et des inſultes pareilles à celles de 1755.

Dans cet etat des choſes, le Roi, qui malgré des intérêts preſſans, s'étoit refuſé, juſques-là aux ouvertures des Etats Unis de l'Amerique Septentrionale, ſentit qu' il n'y avoit plus un moment à perdre, pour former des liaiſons avec eux. Leur independance etoit prononcée et établie par le fait: l'Angleterre l'avoit, en quelque ſorte, reconnuë elle-meme; en laiſſant ſubſiſter des actes, qui tiennent à la ſouveraineté.

Si l'intention du Roi eut été de tromper l'Angleterre, et de l'induire à faire de fauſſes démarches, en la laiſſant dans l'erreur, il auroit enſeveli, dans l'ombre du ſecret, ſes engagemens avec ſes nouveaux alliés: mais les principes de juſtice qui ont dirigé ſa Majeſté, et le deſir ſincère de conſerver la paix, la décidérent à

and magnanimity of the King to ſuch painful proofs, ſhe was making in her ports preparations and armaments which could not have America for their object. Their end was therefore too ſtrongly pointed out to leave the King a poſſibility of miſtaking it. From that moment it became an indiſpenſable duty in his Majeſty to make ſuch diſpoſitions, as might enable him to prevent the evil deſigns of his enemies, and the commiſſion of depredations and inſults ſimilar to thoſe in 1755.

Under theſe circumſtances, the King, who, in oppoſition to his own preſſing intereſts, had hitherto declined all the overtures made to him by the United States of North America, ſaw that not a moment ſhould be loſt in forming an alliance with them. *De facto* their independence was aſſerted and eſtabliſhed. England herſelf had in ſome ſort recognized it, by the permiſſion of ſeveral acts, which are affected to ſovereignty.

Had it been the intention of the King to deceive England, and betray her into any falſe ſteps, by keeping her in error, he would have buried, in the darkneſs of ſecrecy, his engagements with his new allies. But the principles of juſtice, which have guided his Majeſty, and a ſincere deſire of preſerving peace, determined

tenir une conduite plus franche et plus noble. Sa Majeſté crut ſe devoir à elle-même d'éclairer le Roi d'Angleterre, en lui notifiant ſes liaiſons avec les Etats Unis.

Rien ne pouvoit être plus ſimple et moins offenſif, que la Déclaration, que l'Ambaſſadeur de ſa Majeſté remit au Miniſtère Britanique: mais le Conſeil de St. James n'en jugea pas de même; et le Roi d'Angleterre, après avoir rompu la paix en rappellant ſon Ambaſſadeur, dénonça à ſon parlement la démarche de ſa Majeſté, comme un acte d'hoſtilité; comme une aggreſſion formelle et préméditée.

Cependant ce ſeroit s'abuſer de croire que c'eſt la reconnoiſſance, que le Roi a faite de l'independance des Treize Etats-Unis de l'Amerique Septentrionale, qui a irrité le Roi d'Angleterre: ce Prince n'ignore pas ſans doute tous les exemples de ce genre, que fourniſſent les annales Britaniques, et même ſon propre regne: ſon reſſentiment a eu un tout autre principe. Le traité de la France prévenoit, et rendoit inutile le plan formé à Londres d'une coalition momentanée et précaire avec l'Amerique; et il faiſoit échouër les projets ſecrets, qui avoient conduit ſa Majeſté Britanique à une pareille démarche. La veritable cauſe de

him to purſue a conduct more frank and more noble. His Majeſty thought it due to himſelf to give every poſſible light to the King of England, by notifying to him his engagements with the United States.

Nothing could be more ſimple, or leſs offenſive, than the Declaration which his Majeſty's Ambaſſador delivered to the Britiſh Miniſtry. But the Council of St. James formed a different judgment of it. And the King of England, having broken the peace by the recal of his Ambaſſador, annouñced to his Parliament this ſtep of his Majeſty, as an act of hoſtility; as a formal and premeditated aggreſſion.

But it would be to miſlead one's ſelf to believe, that the King's recognition of the independence of the Thirteen United States of North America, was the point which irritated the King of England. This Prince cannot certainly be ignorant of all the examples of this kind, which the Britiſh annals, and even his own reign, have furniſhed. His reſentment had a very different origin. The treaty of France prevented and rendered ineffectual the plan formed at London, of a momentary and precarious coalition with America; and it overturned the ſecret projects, which had led his Britannic Majeſty to attempt this coalition. The

l'animoſité, que le Roi d'Angleterre a manifeſtée, et qu'il a communiquée à ſon Parlement, n'eſt autre que de n'avoir pu rallier à ſa Couronne les Américains pour les armer contre la France.

Une conduite ſi extraordinaire indiquoit evidemment au Roi à quoi il devoit s'attendre de la part de la Cour de Londres; et s'il avoit pu lui reſter le moindre doute à cet égard, ſa Majeſté en eût bientôt trouvé l'eclairciſſement dans les preparatifs immenſes, qui redoublèrent avec la plus étonnante précipitation, dans tous les ports d'Angleterre.

Des démonſtrations auſſi manifeſtement dirigées contre la France dûrent faire la loi à ſa Majeſté. Elle ſe mit en état de repouſſer la force par la force. C'eſt dans cette vuë qu'elle preſſa les armemens dans ſes ports, et qu'elle envoya en Amerique une eſcadre ſous le commandement du Comte d'Eſtaing.

Il eſt notoire, que les forces de la France furent les premieres en état d'agir: il étoit au pouvoir du Roi de porter à l'Angleterre les coups les plus imprevus et les plus ſenſibles. On avouëra même, que ſa Majeſté s'en occupoit, et que ſes projets alloient éclater,

true cauſe of the animoſity which the King of England manifeſted, and which he communicated to his Parliament, was no other than this: he had it not in his power to rally the Americans under the ſtandard of the Crown, and arm them againſt France.

A conduct ſo extraordinary pointed out very clearly to the King what he had to expect from the Court of London. And, could the minuteſt doubt have remained on this ſubject, his Majeſty would ſoon have ſeen it cleared up by the immenſe preparations, which were redoubled, with the moſt aſtoniſhing precipitation, in all the ports of England.

Demonſtrations ſo manifeſtly directed againſt France, could not but preſcribe the rule of his Majeſty's conduct. He put himſelf in a ſituation of repelling force by force. And it was with this view, that he haſtened the armaments in his ports, and that he diſpatched to America a ſquadron under the command of Count d'Eſtaing.

It is notorious, that the forces of France were ready to act before thoſe of England. The King had it in his power to give the moſt unexpected and moſt ſenſible blows to England. It will even be acknowledged that the King was intent upon this deſign, and

lorſqu'une parole de paix l'arrêta.

Le Roi Catholique lui fit part du deſir, que la Cour de Londres laiſſoit entrevoir pour une conciliation par la médiation de l'Eſpagne. Ce monarque ne voulut pas paroître comme médiateur ſans être aſſuré préalablement d'une acceptation claire et poſitive, dans le cas où il offriroit ſon entremiſe; et ſans connoître les objets principaux qui pourroient ſervir de baſe à la négociation.

Le Roi reçut cette ouverture avec une ſatisfaction proportionnée au voeu qu'il a toujours fait pour le maintien de la paix. Quoique le Roi d'Eſpagne eût declaré d'abord, qu'il lui étoit indifférent qu'on acceptât ou qu'on refuſât ſa médiation, et que, nonobſtant les ouvertures qu'il faiſoit, il laiſſa le Roi, ſon neveu, dans une entiére liberté d'agir ſelon ſes vuës; non-ſeulement ſa Majeſté accepta la médiation; mais elle ſuſpendit, ſur le champ, la ſortie de ſa flotte de Breſt, et conſentit à communiquer ſes conditions de paix, " auſſi-tôt que l'Angleterre " auroit articulé d'une manière " poſitive ſon deſir pour une " réconcilation; dans laquelle " ſeroient compris les Etats

that his ſchemes were juſt going to be carried into execution when a ſingle word of peace withheld his hand.

His Catholic Majeſty ſignified to the King the deſire which the Court of London had, in part, diſcovered of a reconciliation, through the mediation of Spain. That Monarch, however, would not appear as mediator without being previouſly aſſured, in clear and poſitive terms, that his mediation would be accepted in caſe he ſhould offer it, nor without being acquainted with the principal objects which were to form the baſis of the negociation.

The King received this overture with a ſatisfaction equal to the wiſhes he has always formed for the maintenance of peace. Though the King of Spain had, at once, declared, that it was a matter of indifference to him, whether his mediation were accepted or refuſed; and that, notwithſtanding the overtures he was making, he left the King his nephew entirely at liberty to act as his own views ſhould direct; his Majeſty not only accepted the mediation, but immediately ſuſpended the ſailing of his fleet from Breſt; and agreed to communicate *his* conditions of peace " as ſoon " as England ſhould have ex- " preſſed, in poſitive terms, her " deſire of a reconciliation, in

" Unis de l'Amerique, la " France ne devant et ne " voulant les abandonner."

Rien assurément ne pouvoit être plus conforme aux intentions apparentes de la Cour de Londres que cette détermination. Le Roi Catholique ne perdit sans doute pas un moment pour agir en conséquence auprès du Roi d'Angleterre, et de son Ministère; mais celuici ne tarda pas à convaincre la Cour de Madrid que ses ouvertures de paix n'avoient point été sincéres. Le Ministère Britanique répondit sans détour, " qu'il ne pouvoit être " question de réconciliation et " de paix, qu'après que la " France auroit retiré sa dé- " claration du 13 Mars de " l'année derniere."

Cette réponse étoit injurieuse pour l'Espagne comme pour la France, et elle decéloit, de la manière la plus évidente, les vuës hostiles de l'Angleterre. Les deux Monarques l'envisagèrent sous ce point de vuë; et, quoique le Roi, toujours animé par son amour pour la paix, laissât encore sa Majesté Catholique le maître de donner, s'il le jugeoit à propos, suite à la médiation, ce Prince ordonna à son Chargé d'Affaires à Londres de garder desormais le silence sur cet objet.

" which the United States of " America should be included; " as neither her duty nor her " inclination permitted France " to abandon them."

Nothing certainly could be more conformable to the apparent intentions of the Court of London, than this resolution. The Catholic King undoubtedly did not lose a moment in taking the proper steps with the King of England and his Ministry. But it was not long ere this Ministry convinced the Court of Madrid that their overtures of peace had not been sincere. The British Ministry answered, in direct terms, " That " nothing could be said about " a reconciliation, and about " peace, till France should " have retracted the declara- " tion she had made in the " month of March of the pre- " ceding year."

This answer was as insulting to Spain as to France, and it set in the strongest light the hostile intentions of England. The two Monarchs saw it in this point of view. And though the King, ever animated by his love of peace, still left his Catholic Majesty at liberty, if he saw fit, to carry on the mediation; yet he ordered his agent at London to guard a profound silence on the subject in future.

Cependant l'eſpoir d'une conciliation flattoit encore le cœur du Roi, lorſque les eſcadres commandées par les Amiraux Keppel et Byron ſortirent des ports d'Angleterre. Cette démonſtration acheva de déchirer le voile léger, ſous lequel la Cour de Londres cherchoit à cacher ſes véritables intentions. Il n'étoit plus permis d'ajouter foi à ſes inſinuations inſidieuſes, ni de douter de ſes projets d'aggreſſion; et dans cet état des choſes ſa Majeſté ſe trouva forcée de changer la direction des meſures, qu'elle avoit priſes précédemment pour la ſûreté de ſes poſſeſſions et du commerce de ſes ſujets.

L'évènement démontra bientôt combien la prévoyance du Roi avoit été juſte. Tout le monde ſçait de quelle maniere la frégate de ſa Majeſté, *la Belle Poule*, fut attaquée par une frégate Angloiſe, à la vuë même des côtes de France: il n'eſt pas moins notoire, que deux autres frégates et un moindre bâtiment furent interceptés par ſurpriſe, et conduits dans les ports d'Angleterre.

La ſortie de l'armée navale, que le Roi avoit miſe ſous les ordres du Comte d'Orvilliers, devint néceſſaire pour rompre les deſſeins des ennemis de ſa couronne, et pour venger les inſultes qu'ils venoient de faire

Nevertheleſs the hope of a reconciliation ſtill flattered the heart of the King, when the ſquadrons, commanded by the Admirals Keppel and Byron, ſailed from the ports of England. This proof entirely tore away the thin veil under which the Court of London was endeavouring to hide her real views. It was no longer poſſible to give credit to her inſidious inſinuations; nor to entertain a doubt of her aggreſſive ſchemes. And in this ſituation his Majeſty was under the neceſſity of changing the plan of operations, which he had before eſtabliſhed, for the protection of his poſſeſſions and of the commerce of his ſubjects.

The event ſoon demonſtrated how prudent the foreſight of the King had been. All the world knows in what manner his Majeſty's frigate, the *Belle Poule*, was attacked by an Engliſh frigate, within ſight even of the coaſts of France. It is equally notorious, that two other frigates, and a ſmaller veſſel, were intercepted by ſurprize, and carried into the ports of England.

The ſailing of the naval army, which the King had put under the command of the Count d'Orvilliers, became neceſſary to defeat the deſigns of the enemies of his Crown, and to avenge the inſults, which

à ſon pavillon. La providence fit triompher les armes de ſa Majeſté: la Comte d'Orvilliers, attaqué par la flotte Angloiſe, la combattit et la força à la retraite, après lui avoir cauſé un dommage conſidérable.

Depuis cette époque les hoſtilités out continué entre les deux Couronnes ſans déclaration de guerre: la Cour de Londres n'en a point fait, parcequ'elle manquoit de moyens pour la juſtifier: d'ailleurs elle n'a oſé accuſer publiquement la France d'être l'aggreſſeur, après l'enlèvement que les eſcadres Angloiſes avoient fait de trois batimens de ſa Majeſté; et elle ſentoit, qu'elle auroit eu trop à rougir, lorſque l'exécution des ordres, qu'elle avoit fait paſſer clandeſtinement aux Indes, auroit éclairé l'Europe ſur la confiance qu'on devoit à ſes diſpoſitions pacifiques, et auroit mis toutes les puiſſances en état de juger à laquelle des deux, de la France ou de l'Angleterre, devoit être décernée la qualification de perfidie, que le Miniſtère Anglois ne perd aucune occaſion de donner à la France.

Quant au Roi, s'il a différé de porter à la connoiſſance de toutes les nations la multiplicité des griefs qu'il avoit contre la Cour de Londres, et de démontrer la néceſſité abſoluë où elle l'a mis de prendre les armes, c'eſt qu'il ne ceſſoit de

they had juſt offered to his flag. Providence crowned his Majeſty's arms with victory. The Count d'Orvilliers, attacked by the Engliſh fleet, fought it, and forced it to retreat, after having done it conſiderable damage.

Since this period hoſtilities have continued between the two Crowns, without any declaration of war. The Court of London has made none, becauſe ſhe was deſtitute of all means of juſtification. Beſides, ſhe dares not publicly accuſe France as the aggreſſor, after the ſeizure made by the Engliſh ſquadrons of three of his Majeſty's veſſels: and ſhe felt that ſhe would have too much reaſon to bluſh, when the execution of the orders, which ſhe had clandeſtinely ſent out to the Indies, ſhould give Europe a clear idea of the confidence due to her pacific diſpoſitions; and enabled all the other powers to decide to which of the two, France or England, the epithet *perfidious* ought to be adjudged. An epithet which the Engliſh Miniſtry loſe no opportunity of applying to France.

As to the King, if he has deferred communicating to all nations the multiplicity of grievances which he has to allege againſt the Court of London; and to demonſtrate the abſolute neceſſity to which he was reduced of taking up

ſe flatter, que le Miniſtère Britanique rentreroit enfin en lui-même, et que la juſtice, et plus encore la poſition critique dans laquelle il avoit mis ſa patrie, l'engageroit à changer de conduite.

Cette eſpérance paroiſſoit d'autant mieux fondée, que les miniſtres Anglois ne ceſſoient de détacher des emiſſaires pour ſonder les diſpoſitions du Roi; tandis que le Roi d'Eſpagne continuoit de lui parler de paix. Sa Majeſté, loin de démentir les ſentimens qu'elle avoit toujours manifeſtés, ſe prêta au contraire avec empreſſement aux nouvelles exhortations du Roi ſon oncle; et, pour convaincre ce Prince de ſa ſincérité et de ſa perſévérance, elle lui confia, ſans reſerve, les conditions moderées auxquelles elle étoit prête de poſer les armes.

Le Roi Catholique communiqua à la Cour de Londres les aſſurances, qu'il venoit de recevoir de ſa Majeſté; et il preſſa cette Cour d'effectuer enfin un rapprochement, pour lequel elle avoit, de ſon côté, temoigné le plus grand déſir. Mais le Miniſtère Britanique, en feignant toujours de ſouhaiter la paix, ne répondit aux démarches officieuſes du Roi d'Eſpagne qu'en lui faiſant des propoſitions déclinatoires et inadmiſſibles.

arms, it was becauſe he would not ceaſe to flatter himſelf, that the Britiſh Miniſtry would be brought to reflect; and that juſtice, and, yet more forcibly, the critical ſituation to which they had reduced their country, would engage them to change their conduct.

This hope appeared to be the better grounded, becauſe the Engliſh Miniſters were continually detaching emiſſaries to ſound the diſpoſition of the King; whilſt the King of Spain was ſtill recommending peace. The King, far from contradicting the ſentiments he had always profeſſed, yielded on the contrary, with the greateſt readineſs, to the new exhortations of the King his uncle. And to convince this Prince of his ſincerity, and of his perſeverance, he communicated to him, without reſerve, the moderate conditions, upon which he was ready to lay down his arms.

The Catholic King communicated to the Court of London the aſſurances which he had juſt received from his Majeſty; and preſſed that Court to effectuate an accommodation, for which his Majeſty, on his part, had teſtified the greateſt deſire. But the Britiſh Miniſtry, always pretending to wiſh for peace, anſwered all the friendly offices of the King of Spain by exceptious and inadmiſſible propoſitions.

Il étoit donc de la derniere evidence que l'Angleterre ne vouloit point la paix, et qu'elle n'avoit d'autre but que de gagner le tems qu'exigeoient ses préparatifs de guerre. Le Roi d'Espagne sentoit parfaitement cette verité; il ne sentoit pas moins combien sa dignité se trouvoit compromise. Cependant ce Prince étoit tellement touché des calamités inseparables de la guerre, et il étoit tellement préoccupé de l'espoir d'en arrêter encore le cours, qu'il oublia tout ce que la conduite de la Cour de Londres avoit d'offensant pour lui, pour ne s'occuper que des moyens de remplir ses vuës pacifiques.

C'est dans cette intention que sa Majesté Catholique proposa au Roi un nouveau plan, selon lequel *les Puissances belligerantes feroient une trève à longues années.* Ce plan fut " agréé par sa Majesté, à con- " dition que les États-Unis y " seroient compris, et qu'ils " seroient traités, durant la " trève, comme independans " de fait :" Et pour donner d'autant plus de facilité au Roi d'Angleterre de souscrire à cette condition essentielle, sa Majesté consentoit, " que ce Prince traitât avec le " Congrès, soit directement, " soit par l'entremise du Roi " d'Espagne."

Here then was the compleatest evidence that England was not inclined to peace; and that she had no other object in view but to gain that time, which her preparations for war demanded. The King of Spain was perfectly sensible of this truth; he was not less sensible how much his dignity had been insulted. But this Prince was at the same time so affected by the calamities inseparable from a state of war; so prepossessed with the hope of being yet able to stop the course of them; that he overlooked every thing offensive in the Court of London, that he might turn all his attention to the means of accomplishing his pacific designs.

It was with this view that his Catholic Majesty proposed a new plan to the King; *by which the belligerent Powers were to make a truce of many years.* This plan was accepted by his Majesty, " on condition that " the United States should be " included: and that, during " the truce, they should be " considered as independent *de* " *facto*:" And to obviate still more the objections which the King of England might make to signing this essential condition, his Majesty consented, " that this Prince might treat " with the Congress, either " directly, or through the in- " tervention of the King of " Spain."

En conſequence de ces ouvertures, ſa Majeſté Catholique redigea la propoſition qu'il s'agiſſoit de faire à la Cour de Londres : Indépendamment *d'une trève illimitée durant laquelle les Etats Unis ſeroient regardés comme independans de fait*; ce Prince, voulant épuiſer tous les moyens, qui pourroient arrêter l'effuſion du ſang humain, prit même ſur lui de propoſer relativement à *l'Amerique, que chacun reſteroit en poſſeſſion de ce qu'il occuperoit au moment de la ſignature de la trève.*

Il n'eſt ſans doute perſonne, qui n'eût jugé que ces conditions ſeroient acceptées. Cependant elles ont été refuſées. La Cour de Londres les a rejettées de la manière la plus formelle, et n'a montré de diſpoſition à la paix, *qu'autant que le Roi abandonneroit les Américains à eux-mêmes.*

Après une déclaration auſſi tranchante, la continuation de la guerre eſt devenue inevitable; et dès-lors ſa Majeſté a dû inviter le Roi Catholique à ſe joindre à elle, en vertu de leurs engagemens, pour venger leurs griefs reſpectifs, et pour mettre un terme à l'empire tyrannique, que l'Angleterre a uſurpé et pretend conſerver ſur toutes les mers.

L'expoſé ſuccint qui vient d'être fait des vuës politiques,

In conſequence of theſe overtures, his Catholic Majeſty reduced into form the propoſition, which was to be made to the Court of London. Independently *of an illimited truce, during which the United States were to be treated as independent* de facto; this Prince, willing to exhauſt all the means, that could ſtop the effuſion of human blood, took upon himſelf to propoſe, in reſpect to *America, that every one ſhould continue in poſſeſſion of what they reſpectively occupied at the moment the truce ſhould be ſigned.*

There is not, undoubtedly, any one who would not have concluded that theſe conditions would have been accepted. And yet they were refuſed. The Court of London rejected them in the moſt formal manner; and ſhewed no inclination to peace, *but on condition, that the King ſhould leave the Americans to themſelves.*

After ſo cutting a declaration, the continuation of war is become inevitable. And from that moment it became his Majeſty to invite the King of Spain to act in conjunction with him, conformably to their engagements, for avenging their reſpective grievances, and for ſetting bounds to the tyrannical empire which England has uſurped, and pretends to maintain over all the ſeas.

The ſhort expoſition here made of the political views, the

des procédés et des évènemens ſucceſſifs, qui ont occaſionné la rupture entre les Cours de Verſailles et de Londres, mettra l'Europe en état de faire le parallèle entre la conduite du Roi, et celle du Roi d'Angleterre; de rendre juſtice à la pureté et à la droiture des intentions qui ont dirigé celle de ſa Majeſté; et de juger lequel des deux ſouverains eſt le veritable auteur de la guerre qui afflige leurs etats; & lequel des deux ſera reſponſable des malheurs qu'elle entrainera après elle.

proceedings, and the ſucceſſive events, which have occaſioned the rupture between the Courts of Verſailles and of London, will enable Europe to draw a parallel between the conduct of the King, and that of the King of England; to do juſtice to the purity and rectitude of the deſigns which have governed his Majeſty; and to judge which of the two ſovereigns is the real author of the war, that afflicts their kingdoms; and which of the two ought to be reſponſible for all the calamities which muſt enſue.

N. B. The French is copied from the Leyden Gazette.

APPEN-

APPENDIX.

No. III.

MEMORIAL *delivered by Doctor* Franklyn, *to the Court of* Verſailles, *in* 1777.

" IT ſeems to be the *preſent* determination of France, and by " ſome it has been thought a wiſe determination, to avoid " *for a time all open interference* in the preſent conteſt between " Great Britain and the Anglo-American Colonies; from a " preſumption, that the former will eventually ſo far exhauſt " herſelf, as to give France an opportunity of more advan- " tageouſly beginning a war at a later period. This ſyſtem of " policy is, however, too refined and dangerous to be *any longer* " *purſued* by a wiſe and provident Adminiſtration. It is " founded upon two ſuppoſitions, which are both not only " doubful but fallacious.

" The firſt is, that Great Britain will, in fact, ſoon be- " come conſiderably weaker, and leſs able to reſiſt the attempts " of a foreign enemy, than ſhe is at preſent, if left unattacked. " This, however, is not true. She will, indeed, ſo long as the " war with America continues, every year add to her national " debts; but ſo long as ſhe can borrow money at pleaſure, which " will be ſo long as ſhe is left at peace in Europe, this addition to " her debt will produce no immediate perceptible debility. On " the contrary, the ſums borrowed, and carried to her pub- " lic debt, will be expended, as *they have been for ſome time*, " in augmenting, repairing, and completely manning her navy, " and in improving and increaſing her army: and both her land " and ſea forces, by conſtant actual ſervice, will every day be- " come more brave, expert, hardy, and formidable; whilſt " thoſe of France, though *ſupported at an expence nearly as great*, " are languiſhing in *unprofitable idleneſs*. In this manner Eng- " land has now become much more powerful than ſhe was the " laſt year, notwithſtanding the addition ſince made to her na- " tional debt; and in the ſame manner ſhe was infinitely " more formidable at the cloſe of the laſt war than at the be- " ginning of it; notwithſtanding her debt had increaſed more " than fifty millions."

The

The ſecond ſuppoſition is, that the war between Great Britain and the united American Colonies will certainly continue for a conſiderable time longer, without any open interference on the part of France. But this ſuppoſition is even more fallacious than the former. The Britiſh government have every thing to loſe, and nothing to gain, by continuing the war.

After the preſent campaign, they will, therefore, doubtleſs make it their great and laſt effort to recover the dominion of America, and terminate the war. "They probably hope, that "a few victories may, by the chance of war, be obtained; and "that theſe on one hand, and the wants and diſtreſſes of the "Coloniſts on the other, may induce them to return again to a "dependance, more or leſs limited, on Great Britain." They muſt be ſenſible, that if ever America is to be conquered by them, it muſt be within the preſent year. That if it be impoſſible to do it in the firſt years of the diſpute, it will be madneſs to expect more ſucceſs afterwards, when the difficulties of their former ſituation are removed; when their new independent governments have acquired ſtability; and when the people are become, as they ſoon will be, well armed, diſciplined, and ſupplied with all the means of reſiſtance. The Britiſh Miniſtry muſt, therefore, be ſenſible, that a continuation of hoſtilities againſt the Colonies after this year, can only tend to prolong the danger, or invite an additional war in Europe; and they, therefore, doubtleſs intend, after having tried the ſucceſs of this campaign, however it may end, to make peace on the beſt terms which can be obtained: and if they cannot recover the Coloniſts as ſubjects, to admit their claim of independency, and ſecure them by a fœderal alliance.

"That this is really the intention of the Britiſh Miniſtry, "ſeems to have been diſcoverable by the late debates in the "Houſe of Peers upon Lord Chatham's motion; and it is con-"firmed by reaſon *as well as by private intelligence.*"

There ſeems, therefore, no means left for France to *prevent the Coloniſts* from being ſhortly *reconciled* to Great Britain either as ſubjects or as allies; but to enter immediately into ſuch engagements with them, as will neceſſarily preclude all others; ſuch as will permanently bind and ſecure their commerce and friendſhip, and enable them, as well to repel the attacks, as to ſpurn at the offers, of their preſent enemy.

It muſt be remembered, that the firſt reſiſtance of the Coloniſts was not to obtain independency, but a redreſs of their grievances; and that *there are many among them*, who might,

even now, be ſatisfied with a limited ſubjection to the Britiſh Crown. A majority have indeed put in for the prize of independency; but they have done it partly *on a confidence that France, attentive to her moſt important intereſts, would ſoon give them open and effectual ſupport.* But when they find themſelves diſappointed; when they ſee *ſome of the powers of Europe furniſh troops to aſſiſt in their ſubjugation, another power proſcribing their commerce,* and the reſt *looking on as indifferent ſpectators*; it is very probable, that deſpairing of foreign aid, and ſeverely preſſed by their enemies and their own internal wants and diſtreſſes, they may be inclined to accept of ſuch terms, as it will be the intereſt and diſpoſition of the Britiſh government to grant them. Lord George Germaine, but a few weeks ſince, declared in the Houſe of Commons, that his hope of ending the American war this year, was principally founded on the diſappointment which the Coloniſts would feel, when they diſcover that no aſſiſtance is likely to be given them by France. And the Britiſh adherents in America will ſpare no pains to ſpread and increaſe that diſappointment, by diſcouraging repreſentations. They already intimate, that France, *equally hoſtile to both parties, foments the preſent war, only to make them mutual inſtruments of each other's deſtruction.*

Should Great Britain, by theſe and other means, detach the Colonies, and reunite them to herſelf, France *will irrevocably loſe the moſt favourable opportunity ever afforded to any nation of humbling a powerful, arrogant, and hereditary enemy. An opportunity which no human wiſdom could have produced; and which the moſt zealous of her patriots could ſcarcely have hoped for in our days.*

But it is not ſimply the opportunity of *reducing* Great Britain which France will loſe by her preſent inactivity; for her own ſafety, and that of all her American poſſeſſions, will be endangered, the moment in which a reconciliation takes place between Britain and America. *The King and Miniſtry of Great Britain already know that France has encouraged and aſſiſted the Coloniſts in their preſent reſiſtance*; and they are already as much incenſed againſt her, as they would be were ſhe openly to declare war. *In truth, France has done too much, unleſs ſhe intends to do more.* Without giving the Coloniſts effectual aſſiſtance, it would have been better to leave them wholly unaſſiſted. The Britiſh nation, naturally inimical to the French, pants after peace with America, that ſhe may turn her arms againſt this kingdom; and at once gratify her revenge and her avarice. This is now the general language of the people, *and of the leaders of*

the oppoſition in England. " Even the *temperate* Lord Camden, " but a few days ſince, concluded a long, and much applauded, " ſpeech, in the Houſe of Peers, by fervently wiſhing for a " peace with America, and a war with all the world. *The* " *Miniſtry, indeed, from prudential conſiderations, have, for the* " *preſent, avoided ſuch open declarations of their wiſhes and inten-* " *tions:*" but one, who reflects upon the preceding obſervations, cannot doubt, but that, whenever peace with America is obtained by Great Britain, whatever may be the conditions of it, her whole force on the Continent of America will be ſuddenly tranſported to the Weſt Indies, and employed in ſubduing the French Sugar Iſlands there, to recompenſe her loſſes and expences in this war, and to revenge *the ſecret encouragement and aſſiſtance, which France is ſuppoſed to have given the Coloniſts againſt Great Britain.*

N. B. The paſſages between inverted commas are left out by Almon in his publication of this Memorial.

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